Continuation of ratification process welcomed

1. How does the future of the EU after the Irish ‘No’ look like?

 

After the European Council meeting in December 2008 which has been dominated by economic and energy issues, the future of the EU seems to be regarded quite optimistically in Germany. Especially the prospect of Ireland holding a second referendum on the Lisbon Treaty before the end of the European Commission’s term of office has been warmly welcomed. The German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier, “was in confident mood: ‘Together with our Irish friends, we have agreed on a process which will allow a new referendum in Ireland and enable the Treaty to enter into force at the end of 2009’”.[1] This agreement, reached at the European Council meeting,[2] is mostly seen as a continuation of the ratification process, and there is not much discussion about the consequences of a second ‘No’ vote.[3] The only party in the German parliament sceptical of a second referendum is the Left Party (“Die Linke”), arguing that such a procedure is everything but democratic.[4] The Left is also the only party in the German parliament arguing for a stop of the current ratification process,[5] having also voted against the law approving of the Lisbon Treaty.[6]

The parliamentary ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in Germany had been completed in May 2008.[7] Meanwhile, the Federal President, Horst Köhler, has approved of the respective laws, which are now published in the Federal Law Gazette.[8] Köhler still waits, though, to sign the ratification bill until the federal constitutional court (‘Bundesverfassungsgericht’) has returned a verdict on the appeals against the Lisbon Treaty. The hearings were held on the 10 and 11 February 2009.[9]

As also agreed on at the European Council meeting in December 2008, the European elections will take place according to the rules of the Nice Treaty.[10] Should the Lisbon Treaty enter into force, the number of MEPs for member states having more MEPs according to the rules of the Lisbon Treaty will be increased accordingly. Yet, Germany (the only member state having fewer MEPs according to the rules of the Lisbon Treaty) will keep its three additional MEPs, as it has been agreed that the number of MEPs will rise from 736 to 754 during the 2009-2014 legislative period of the European Parliament if the Lisbon Treaty enters into force.[11] Maybe this is the reason why there is not much discussion about this, neither in the parties nor in the press.

All German parties are in the process of setting up their lists, choosing their candidates, and drafting their programmes for the coming European elections in June 2009. All this seems to be business as usual.[12] Only in Bavaria, where the CSU, the sister party of the CDU, has its own list, there is some ‘commotion’ as the party has to ensure to reach the German-wide threshold of 5 percent. This might be difficult as the party lost a lot of votes in the last state parliament elections in September 2008 and because in other German states (‘Länder’), local elections will be held on the same day as the European elections.[13]

With regard to the European Commission, the decision taken at the European Council meeting in December 2008 to keep the principle of ‘one commissioner per member state’ is pitied, although widely regarded as necessary to ensure that Ireland is able to hold a second referendum.[14] This view is also expressed, for example, by the “Confederation of German Employers’ Associations” (BDA) and the “Federation of German Industries” (BDI).[15] Otherwise, the appointment of a new European Commission is, so far, not very much discussed.

The fact that issues about the future of the EU do not receive much attention so far might be due to the upcoming general elections in Germany which will take place in September 2009. As a new German government constellation might entail new official German positions on such issues, it remains to be seen how the various parties score in the European elections, in the various state and local elections, and especially in the general elections.[16]

 

2. Transatlantic relations renewed after President Bush: top priorities

 

Transatlantic relations with Obama: renewed but not reinvented

The new president-elect of the United States of America, Barack Obama, was also the favourite candidate of the majority of Germans. In fact, the Financial Times Deutschland, in cooperation with the opinion research institute Forsa, found out that Obama would win three quarters of all votes if the Germans were his electorate.[17] Thus, support for his agenda is widespread but also fuelled by high expectations.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel, from the Christian Democratic Party (CDU), offered close cooperation to the newly elected American President. In a phone call to Obama, she pointed in particular to “the challenges that the international community is facing”, such as the Iranian nuclear programme, the stabilisation of Afghanistan, the climate change and the financial crisis.[18] In reaction to Obama’s presidential speech, Merkel expressed that she “anticipates more multilateralism from now on.” However, the expectations on the new President are extremely high and one should not forget that he is ‘only a human’ too.[19]

Her party colleague and spokesperson for foreign policy affairs of the faction in the German Bundestag, Eckart von Klaeden, underlined the points she mentioned but also warned that the “times of excuses from Europe” have ended with Obama. This means that if Europe is calling for more consultation from the American side in international affairs, it should be prepared to “act effectively”. From a German perspective, this refers especially to the commitment in Afghanistan. While von Klaeden does not think that Obama’s first action in office will be to call for more German troops to the war zone, he stresses the importance of combining military and civil operations.[20] Also, Ruprecht Polenz, head of the Foreign Affairs Committee and member of the CDU, supports this view: One should not only concentrate on the military aspect of the engagement in Afghanistan. Instead, he says, it is important to stabilise the country and the region. This includes civil reconstruction efforts but also political dialogue with the neighbours, such as Pakistan.[21] Indirectly, this could be seen as a concession to Obama.

However, to make this ‘effective multilateralism’ work, von Klaeden argues that neither the USA can attempt to undertake strategic international operations on their own, nor can Europe decline its responsibilities. Especially in regions of the world where Europe’s prestige is better than that of the USA, like in the East or Middle East, chances for common success are higher. Moreover, the EU has built up extensive resources and expertise in the field of civil crisis management and reconstruction, which can serve as an important attribute to achieve the above.[22] Nonetheless, the outstanding commitment of the USA in the Middle East will not cease with the new President. This is why Polenz called on Obama to put the conflict on top of his priority list.[23] Moreover, Polenz is convinced that the transatlantic relationship will experience a “return of diplomacy” with Obama, who is expected to accommodate his allies more than his predecessor. Yet, nobody will ask for permission from Europe. There will rather be a common conclusion from the analysis of a problem, which then also demands common action. This will have consequences for Germany and Europe. In conclusion, his style of policy will be more demanding.[24]

Just on the day of Obama’s inauguration, the CDU/CSU faction on the German Bundestag published a strategic paper called “For a closer transatlantic partnership”.[25] In this paper, they highlight again the priorities of their party and invited Obama to explore new ways in the economic, environmental, security, and foreign policy together with Europe. The paper explicitly encourages the new American administration to join the Kyoto Protocol and negotiate further steps.[26] Additionally, the CDU/CSU faction stressed the importance of NATO as central instrument of the transatlantic security and defence policy. A new concept is needed to adapt this alliance to the global challenges, which are no longer geographically confined. This is also seen as a task for the EU.[27]

The open letter from Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier to President Obama, which was published in Der Spiegel magazine on 12 January 2009, can partly be read as a statement as candidate for chancellorship of his Social Democratic Party (SPD).[28] Nonetheless, this letter addresses a number of issues that can generally be seen as top priorities for a future transatlantic relationship from a German government perspective. The actual ranking of these priorities might however differ, depending on who is articulating them.

Thus, Steinmeier framed his priorities in three broad categories: 1) ‘Working together in conflict regions’; 2) ‘Working towards security in both East and West’; and 3) ‘For a global community of shared responsibility’. In the following sub-themes he welcomes Obama’s announcement to close the prison camps in Guantanamo and pleads for alternative solutions in the fight against terrorism. Rather than military force, it would be more effective to support economic development and create ‘life-perspectives to help people find their way out of poverty’. The Middle East, Iran, Iraq and especially Afghanistan, serve as examples in this point. Reading between the lines, it seems obvious that Steinmeier does not want to upset Obama by refusing additional commitment in any of these conflict zones. On the other hand, he also does not want to be associated with support for these wars, since they are highly unpopular with the German electorate.[29]

For the second category, Steinmeier points at the need to re-think the role and mission of NATO, but also stresses the responsibility of the USA and Russia to help countering the proliferation of nuclear weapons. With regards to the third category, he recalled the world financial summit in Washington as a new start to integrate “new powers” into a global system of responsibility, which expands beyond financial issues. Climate protection and energy security were mentioned as additional key topics in this regard.[30]

Notwithstanding the Steinmeier’s position, Hans-Ulrich Klose from the SPD faction in the German Bundestag openly voices his belief, according to which Germany should take over the Quick Reaction Force and “make it strong enough so that it can be deployed in Afghanistan- also in the South”. Klose is well known for his dissenting views and as an America-friendly tansatlanticists.[31] Karsten Voigt (also SPD), coordinator for German-American cooperation in the Foreign Ministry, warned the Europeans already during the campaigns of Obama and McCain that no matter who will win the elections, and despite the acknowledged relevance of multilateral cooperation from both sides, multilateralism will never have the same importance for the USA as for Germany.[32] This can only be understood under the “constitutional political tradition” of the United States, its “world power status”, and its “political culture”.[33]

Nonetheless, Voigt sees great potential for transatlantic cooperation, but Europe will have to play its part. Themes that he mentions as being vital and maybe most sensitive for this partnership include the fight against terrorism, realisation of a peace order in the Middle East, the geo-political and economic challenges through emerging powers, and the conflicts in Afghanistan, the Balkan region, Africa and Asia. The current financial crisis also makes it indispensable to think about a new transatlantic economic partnership. Protectionist measures as often advocated by the Democrats would harm Germany as an exporting nation especially. For the EU-American relationship, Voigt identifies two major tasks: First of all, it is necessary to find a common stance on measures to meet the climate change and to ensure energy security. Secondly, and this at least for Europe is somehow connected to the latter point, both have to come to terms with Russia. Being an essential political and economic partner, and also a direct neighbour for Europe, America should not attempt to make the development of transatlantic cooperation depending on Europe’s relationship with Russia.[34]

Guido Westerwelle, leader of the Liberal Party (FDP), mentioned “nuclear disarmament” as major point when sketching his vision for a new German foreign policy in view of the changes in America. In doing so, he took reference to a joint declaration of four outstanding German “elder statesman”[35] who pleaded for “a world without nuclear threats”. This in turn was a reaction to an appeal issued by four elder statesmen from the USA in 2007, who also called for a “world free of atomic weapons”.[36]

Werner Hoyer, spokesperson for foreign affairs of the FDP faction in the German Bundestag, formulated the international challenges ahead as to “overcome a giant crisis of trust”, which does not stop at the financial markets and the economic policies. Rather it has to reconsider the “fundamental values and principles of political action that once made the USA strong and were the basis for its international attractiveness”.[37] In this, Hoyer sees a chance for Europe, together with the USA, to re-define “the West”, which includes a clear hint at America’s isolated standing on Guantanamo and Abu Ghraib. Furthermore, he cites the financial crisis as a topic that needs to be tackled – together with the emerging economies of the South and East. The G20 Summit in Washington thus poses a promising starting point. Finally, he puts the relevance and future of NATO on the discussion table, too. Hoyer expects closer cooperation from the new US government with the other NATO members, and interprets the announcement of the US-Foreign Ministry to push no longer for Georgia’s hasty admission to the Membership Action Plan as a positive sign “bearing Obama’s handwriting”.[38]

The leaders of the Green Party (Bündnis 90/Die Grünen), Claudia Roth and Reinhard Bütikofer, explained that their priority is a transatlantic initiative in the area of climate and energy policy.[39] Whereas Rainder Steenblock (member of the German Bundestag for the Greens) in his position as OSCE election observer noted that the social climate in Germany might change when the new US-government is going to pursue different political aims. This will also have an effect on Germany’s readiness to develop a common strategy for Afghanistan together with the US, which eventually will soften Germany’s resistance to any additional deployment of troops in Afghanistan. However, this needs the respective preconditions.[40] Helmut Schloz, member of the Leftist Party (Die Linke) executive committee, merely asks Obama to stick to his promises.[41]

One of the first actions in office of the new President was to undertake steps to close the Guantanamo prison camps and to halt the military trials, as he promised. While the move as such was welcomed by all political parties, it soon evolved into to discussion about Germany’s obligation to accept ex-prisoners. Wolfgang Schäubele, CDU Minister for the Interior, sees the “humanitarian responsibility” to care for an “acceptable future of the prisoners” with the US government and is not of the opinion that Germany generally should host any of them. Foreign Minister Steinmeier, also in his role as presidential candidate for the SPD, already offered that Germany could think about such a step.[42] The last word has not been spoken and the issue will remain part of the ongoing debate.

But not only politicians are placing great hopes on the new president-elect. Also, civil society groups are hoping that Obama will set positive trends nationally but also on the international scale. Michael Sommer, Chief of the Confederation of German Trade Unions (DGB), for example, is talking about a “good sign for employees” as they might enjoy better social rights from now on. And Jürgen Thurmann, President of the Industrial Union, claims stronger ties between the European and American economy to formulate and enforce joint answers to the global challenges.[43] Environmental groups in Germany are placing high expectations on the new president as well. The green group BUND postulates that the US “like all other industrialized countries” has to “move to a sustainable economic model”. And the environmental group NABU is hopeful that “an Obama administration would have a fundamentally different approach to climate protection than outgoing US President Bush”.[44]

However, German researchers who analyse the prospects of a new transatlantic relationship are sceptical about the real impact that the new President Obama will and can have. Similar to Karsten Voigt, Stefan Fröhlich from the University of Erlangen-Nürnberg, stresses America’s different approach to the concept of multilateralism. While he does think that there will be more transatlantic cooperation, he assumes that it will be more “instrumental”.[45] Meaning that Washington will decide from case to case whether and how it will consult with partners. Fröhlich also suggests, that those partners do not always have to be European. Moreover, international cooperation in the understanding of US politicians has a strong connotation of “burden sharing”. It can be expected that Obama is going to try to rebuild the image of America as the “friendly hegemon”. Yet, this also implies that allies are needed to share the unpleasant tasks. These assumptions are underlined by Obama’s promise to double American foreign aid on the one hand, and his announcement to increase the defence budget and the number of military troops.[46] Moreover, Fröhlich warns that high expectations are likely to be disappointed. Reading the signs of Obama’s first political steps carefully, reveals that transatlantic relations are not necessarily on top of his list. In the end, “it was the economy that won the campaign” and not his policy on Iraq. All together, Europe should expect a “pragmatic” approach to the coming transatlantic partnership. Nevertheless, there will be opportunities for the EU to influence and shape this agenda. [47]

Most of the above mentioned points are also shared by Peter Rudolf, head of the America research group at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. In addition, he underlines the change in rhetoric that has taken place under Obama. It can be expected that he will make a greater effort to rehabilitate and use America’s ‘soft power’. This also includes the instrumentalisation of ‘global governance institutions’ to integrate emerging powers. Along with this goes the understanding that America inhabits a ‘natural leadership role’ in organisations, such as the UN. On the other hand, America is autonomous enough not to join the International Court of Justice and also Obama remains sceptical in this question. He decided to wait and watch for now.[48]

Overall, it appears that the Afghanistan question will have a strong impact on the German-American and transatlantic relationship. An opinion poll published by the Financial Times reveals that some 60 percent of the German population would not wish their government to send more troops to Afghanistan “under any circumstances”.[49] However, as can be filtered out from the contributions above, it is most likely that Obama will demand some sort of contribution to this front from Europe. Thus, this issue will also be crucial for German-EU relations and the role of the EU as a civil-military partner. Additionally, the same opinion poll shows that “dealing with the international financial crisis” is in the top range of Germany’s priority list. However, whereas near to 60 percent of Americans subscribe to this point, only about 30 percent of Germans do so. Consequently, this could lead to a conflict of interest when other issues are given less attention than expected. Last but not least, the transatlantic partnership will be determined by Obama’s commitment to address environmental issues responsibly and sustainable. In the short term, however, many debates on all that in Germany will also be fought under the umbrella of the upcoming elections. It will be interesting to see which issues gain top priority once German politics follow their business as usual and once Obama has settled in his new office. One should not forget, after all, that Obama faces a serious amount of challenges at home, too.

3. Financial crisis and challenges of global governance: the EU response

 

United in economic diversity?

Before giving an overview of the German debate about the European Union’s role in the current economic and financial crisis and the implications the crisis has for the global economic and political power constellation a short remark on the prominence of these topics in the general German discourse about the crisis has to be made. The topics touched here are less prominent in the public debate in Germany. Three other questions are fare more prevailing: 1) Is it necessary to bail out bankrupt financial institutions? 2) Should the same be done for companies active in the real economy? 3) How is the money to support the economy efficiently spent and who receives which shares?

The evaluation of the EU’s performance is often just a side aspect, but a general trend can be identified among these statements. Most people participating take an intergouvernmentalist view of the European Union in the debate. The debate about long-term implications is even more restricted to expert circles. Most participants agree that multipolarisation will be the major effect of the current crisis.

Europe – a continent petrified by the crisis?

Reviewing the French Council Presidency the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel (Christian Democrats[50]), concluded that Europe has shown that a common set of instruments and coordinated national approaches brought the financial crisis partly under control.[51] Furthermore, she argued that to cope with the economic crisis a common approach is even more necessary than in the case of the financial crisis. This common approach has to be coordinated among all member states and not in any type of a European subgroup, she said in a parliamentary debate. Thus, the European Council could be regarded as an “economic government of Europe”.[52] Merkel and outspokenly the whole German federal government support the European Commission’s “European Economic Recovery Plan“[53] as going into the right direction. But in the same debate Merkel called for level-headedness. The German federal government would take measures adequate to the development of the economic crisis, but in a mid-term perspective all states had to comply with the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact.[54] This policy of deficit spending which keeps Peer Steinbrück’s, Social Democratic[55] Federal Minister of Finance, mid-term goal of having a balanced budget in mind, brought her soon criticism from many member states being “Germany’s Frau Nein”.[56]

Frank-Walter Steinmeier, Social Democratic Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, as a member of the German federal government supports Chancellor Merkel’s view, and argues that a ‘one size fits all’ approach would not be appropriate to stimulate the European economies with their different structures.[57] In his role as the Social Democratic front runner in the federal parliamentary election in September 2009 Steinmeier emphasises other aspects.[58] In a strategy paper titled “European future pact for employment”[59] published on 13 November 2008 Steinmeier stresses that the citizens of the European Union, and the world, expect the Union to not only generate new legislation, but also to act. The paper lists nine proposals from an intensified social dialog to the claim that Europe should play a leading role in restructuring the global financial market.[60]

Steinbrück agrees with Chancellor Merkel on the German economic stimuli package and the general positive evaluation of the European Union’s performance. He does not see any deficits in European coordination of fiscal and economic policy. The Council for Economic and Financial Affairs would come close to a ‘European economic government’ and the European Council could act in this role if necessary. He is strongly against the idea of the French President Nicolas Sarkozy to install an economic government of the Eurozone. That would divide the European Union in two classes of member states.[61] Regarding the European Union as a whole, Steinbrück is more critical and identifies a “leadership problem” because “27 different members […] have still not decided on how to work with each other”[62].

The opposition in the German federal parliament tries to stress much more its criticism concerning the performance of the European Union and the federal government. But its general perception of the European Union is not so far away from the government’s point of view. Werner Hoyer, Liberal[63] MP, doubts that the European Union will be able to act effectively in 2009 due to the European elections, the decision about the new European Commission and a, according to Hoyer, weak Czech Presidency. Thus, he concludes that the national governments will be the crucial actors in the coming months. Meanwhile the German Federal Minister of Finance weakened due to, according to Hoyer, Germany’s stance on the European level by criticising his colleagues from other member states. However, he especially agrees with the question whether the Stability and Growth Pact should be applied in a strict or loose manner with the federal government’s European policy.[64] Oskar Lafontaine from the Left Party[65] evaluates the performance of the French Presidency very positively. He agrees with the French President Sarkozy that the current challenges the European Union is facing cannot be dealt with on a national level; a European-wide answer had to be found. But according to him the German federal government did everything it could to block a common European approach, but luckily did not succeed. A second point of disagreement with position of the German federal government, concerns the question of a ‘European economic government’. The Left Party strongly favours this proposal of the French Presidency.[66] According to Renate Künast, from the Green Party,[67] the name “Madame Non” is an appropriate description of Chancellor Merkel’s policy on the European level, which lacks any initiative. The conclusions of the European Council are, from her point of view, a non sufficient response to the economic crisis. One cause for the inappropriateness of the measures she identifies is the fact that ten ministers from different European member states have eight different opinions.[68]

While politicians in Germany underline the reached or still necessary common European approach, scientists draw a more differentiated picture. Martin Koopmann, from the CDU-near the “Konrad-Adenauer-Foundation” agrees with the politicians that the common crisis management was efficient at last.[69] But first the governments underwent a ‘trial-and-error-process’ to find a common position, which especially between the French and German government, disagreements existed. Jutta Frasch, guest researcher at the “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik”, attributes these disagreements to the fact that the German government was caught by surprise and was not able to define its own strategy at first.[70] This period of inefficient talk and action ended, according to Koopmann, with a period in which the positions of the European national governments converged. The nucleus of this process sees Koopmann[71] in the meeting of the four European G8 member states on 4 October 2008.[72] The following steps of this coordination process were the meeting of the Economic and Financial Affairs Council on 7 October 2008,[73] the first meeting of the heads of state and government of the Eurozone member states on 12 October 2008,[74] and finally the European Council on 15 and 16 October 2008 on which the member states agreed on number of common measures to cope with the financial crisis.[75] The role of the European Commission describes Koopmann in these times as a mere supporting one. Regarding the fact that the governments of the Eurozone member states played a crucial role in finding a common position on measures to solve the financial crisis Frasch remarks that establishing a economic government of the Eurozone, as proposed by French President Sarkozy, might be counterproductive. The informal character of the Eurogroup, according to Frasch, made it especially flexible enough to react efficiently.[76]

The well-suited reaction of the European Central Bank (ECB) is regarded as an example of efficient crisis management.[77] According to Werner Becker, researcher at “Deutsche Bank Research”, the ECB fulfils three crucial functions during the crisis: It provides as a “lender of last liquidity”[78] not just the markets of the Eurozone with liquidity since the crisis emerged. Its monetary policy is internationally coordinated with the Federal Reserve in the United States. Finally, the ECB acts as a mediator between the national governments.[79] Politicians share the view that the common currency is a factor of stability during the economic and financial crisis as well.[80]

As a first critique Koopmann argues, supported by Heribert Dieter from the “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik”,[81] that the crisis did not reach the European Union unexpectedly, but Europe did not prepare itself while the crisis crossed the Atlantic. Hans-Werner Sinn, economist at the “ifo Institute”, disagrees with this argument by saying that neither intensity nor the schedule of the current crisis could have been predicted.[82] European governments had hoped that the financial crisis would remain in America; however, when the “Lehman Brothers” filed for bankruptcy, the seriousness of the financial crisis and its broadening effects could no longer be ignored.[83]

The second, and even more severe critique Koopmann expresses is the European Union’s insufficient equipment with institutional features to allow an immediate response to sudden crises.[84] The crisis put the lengthy debated question, whether an integrated market and common monetary policy can be efficient without a common fiscal policy, back on the agenda. Koopman concludes that, due to this institutional ‘feature’ of the EU the European Commission can hardly be blamed for its inactivity during the crisis.[85] Furthermore, Daniela Schwarzer, researcher at the “Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik”, points out that the structure and size of the EU budget restrict the EU’s ability to stimulate the economy on its own.[86] Frasch agrees that the loose coordination of the economic and fiscal policies of the member states under the framework of the ‘open method of coordination’ is causing problems, but points out that the “European Economic Recovery Plan”[87] might be a sign for a revision on positions held by the national governments.[88] Schwarzer reminds here that a precondition is still a consensus between the member states’ governments on the fiscal policy measures.[89]

Werner Abelshauser, professor for economic history, is more critical and criticises the performance of the European Commission as being not good. The member states remain the dominant actors, what is, according to him, not a disadvantage. He recognises the value of the European Union, especially in the current crisis, as an instrument that increases the nation states’ ability to act.[90] Going even further Joscha Schmierer, former adviser of Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Steinmeier and former Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer, explicitly agrees in his column for the “Heinrich Böll Foundation. The Green Political Foundation” in a somehow unusual coalition with Sinn’s following point of view:[91] Sinn points out that according to their national economic structures each member state has different interests concerning the question how the crisis should be solved.[92] Thus a common European approach to cope with the crisis is unlikely, as each government had to justify these measures before its national electorate.[93] Sinn asks: Would the Brits pay for a bankrupt German industry? He doesn’t think so.[94]

Evaluating the European crisis management is just one side of the debate. Most participants already think about lessons that should be drawn from the current crisis. Federal Minister of Finance, Steinbrück, envisions the funding of a European financial authority in a long, but not in a short-term perspective, as a measure to prevent future financial crises.[95] His secretary of state, Jörg Asmussen, pointed out in an article, on which role the European Union should play in short-term measures.[96] According to him, the best way to reduce the probability of future financial crises is to implement the roadmap the Council for Economic and Financial Affairs agreed on in October 2007.[97] But this had to be complemented by the implementation of the recommendations the “Financial Stability Forum” made in April 2008.[98] Dieter is much more pessimistic in his analysis: “A common European proposal for reforming international financial policy is increasingly unlikely […].”[99] Especially the British interest in the ‘city of London’s’ competitiveness on the global financial market is, according to him, a major obstacle for a common European position.[100] But without a common position and a significant contribution to the stimulation of the economy, Europe will not play a significant role in restructuring the global financial market.[101]

“The world is clearly searching for a new order”[102]

“[N]ew players and Powers that still have to find their places in the international order are seeking to enter the global stage.”[103] According to Steinmeier, Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, the financial crisis is one factor among several contributing to this development. He is “certain that the painful tremors on the world financial markets will accelerate the multipolarization of the international financial system.”[104] His fellow party member and Federal Minister of Finance, Steinbrück, does not “expect any immediate, visible shifts”[105], but agrees with Steinmeier on the direction of the shift. According to him, within a decade, the importance of ‘wall street’ and the ‘city of London’ will not diminish but more financial centres will gain influence. He names China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and Europe. This influence he does not just see in terms of economic power but also in political influence on regulatory frameworks and on the prevailing market philosophy.[106] As a short-term result, Asmussen, secretary of state in the German Federal Ministry of Finance, expects that the financial sector’s share of world economy will decrease.[107]

The envisioned reform of the group of eight (G8) to a group of 20 (G20) is centrally discussed as a reaction to shifts in the international economic power constellation. Steinbrück regards it as an anticipation of future economic realities. While he does not believe that shifts in the economic power structure will go as far as a loss of the United States’ leading role.[108] But after the G20 Summit on 15 November 2008 in Washington, he doubts that it will ever be possible to return to a G7 format.[109] In the leadership question, the German Federal Minister for Foreign Affairs, Steinmeier, is more sceptical: “no single player will be able to lay down those rules [regulating the financial markets]. It will no longer be possible for any one country to act as if it were immune to undesirable developments.”[110] Scientists see as well the formation of the G20 as an indicator for the revaluation of the political role of the ‘emerging markets’ as a long-lasting result of the current crisis.[111]

The evaluation of the G20’s future role is ambivalent: Abelshauser regards the open leadership question in the G20 as a problem. According to him in the G20 format, it is still unclear who will decide what.[112] And he reminds that the goal of regulating the financial market has already been put on the agenda of the then G7 by the former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt in 1980 and remained there unresolved since then. In a comparative perspective Hanns Günther Hilpert and Stormy Mildner conclude as well, that the increased number of actors make compromises on financial market regulations more difficult.[113] Instead, Steinmeier regards this increased number as a chance for the European Union. “Europe, with its tried-and-tested policy of mediation and reconciliation of interests, could play a key role in this.”[114]

 

 

[1] German Federal Foreign Office: The EU Reform Treaty, available at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/LissabonVertrag/Reformvertrag.html (last access 3 February 2009).
[2] For more details see Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council. 11 and 12 December 2008. Presidency Conclusions, 12 December 2008, 17271/08, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[3] Cf. the parliamentary debate on Steinmeier’s government declaration of 18 December 2008, see Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, pp. 21128(A)-21151(C), available at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[4] See, for example, the statement by Oskar Lafontaine (DIE LINKE) in the parliamentary debate on Steinmeier’s government declaration of 18 December 2008, see Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, 18 December 2008, p. 21137(B)-(C), available at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[5] See, for example, Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, 18 December 2008, p. 21151(B)-(C), available at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 February 2009). The corresponding documents are: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Ausschusses für die Angelegenheiten der Europäischen Union (21. Ausschuss) zu dem Antrag der Abgeordneten Dr. Diether Dehm, Monika Knoche, Hüseyin-Kenan Aydin, weiterer Abgeordneter und der Fraktion DIE LINKE – Drucksache 16/8879 – Das Ratifizierungsverfahren zum Vertrag von Lissabon aussetzen – Ein Sozialprotokoll vereinbaren, Drucksache 16/10832, 11 November 2008, available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/108/1610832.pdf (last access 3 February 2009) and Entschließungsantrag der Fraktion DIE LINKE. Zu der Abgabe einer Regierungserklärung durch den Bundesminister des Auswärtigen zu den Ergebnissen des Europäischen Rats am 11./12. Dezember 2008, Drucksache 16/11404, 16 December 2008, available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/114/1611404.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[6] See Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/157, 24 April 2008, pp. 16482(D)-16485(C), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16157.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[7] Institut für Europäische Politik (Ed.): EU-27 Watch, No. 7, September 2008, Berlin, p. 16, available at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/EU_Watch/EU-27_Watch_No_7.pdf (last access 3 February 2009). See also Pressing on with ratification: The German reaction to the Irish ‘No’, in: Institut für Europäische Politik (Ed.): EU-27 Watch, No. 7, September 2008, Berlin, pp. 36-38, available at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/EU_Watch/EU-27_Watch_No_7.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[8] S. Höll/R. Bodensteiner: Köhler billigt EU-Vertrag, in: sueddeutsche.de, 8 October 2008, available at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/401/313308/text/ (last access 3 February 2009); Reference and Research Services of the Deutscher Bundestag: Laws relating to the Treaty of Lisbon: certification, promulgation, entry into force, Topical Term of 30 October 2008, Research Paper 66/08, available at: http://www.bundestag.de/wissen/analysen/2008/gesetze_zum_vertrag_von_lissabon.pdf (last access 3 February 2009). For the laws published in the Federal Law Gazette see: Gesetz zum Vertrag von Lissabon vom 13. Dezember 2007, vom 8. Oktober 2008, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 2008, Teil II Nr. 27, 14 October 2008, p. 1038, available at: http://frei.bundesgesetzblatt.de/pdf/bgbl2/bgbl208s1038.pdf (last access 3 February 2009) and Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes (Artikel 23, 45 und 93), vom 8. Oktober 2008, in: Bundesgesetzblatt, Jahrgang 2008, Teil 1 Nr. 45, 16 October 2008, p. 1926, available at: http://www.bgblportal.de/BGBL/bgbl1f/bgbl108s1926.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[9] Among others, a conservative MP from the CSU, Peter Gauweiler, and the parliamentary faction of the Left Party have appealed to the constitutional court. For the appeals and a first coverage of the hearing see, for example, Reinhard Müller: Bewährungsprobe für Europas Integration. Das Verfassungsgericht verhandelt über den Lissabon-Vertrag, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 10 February 2009; Heribert Prantl: Deutsch-europäischer Showdown, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 February 2009; Helmut Kerscher: Macht, die andere ohnmächtig macht, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 10 February 2009; Heribert Prantl: Verfassungsgericht zweifelt an der EU-Reform, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 February 2009; Helmut Kerscher: Europas Reformvertrag wird in Karlsruhe zerlegt, in: Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11 February 2009. For a first assessment of the appeals see, for example: Elmar Brok/Martin Selmayr: Der ‚Vertrag der Parlamente’ als Gefahr für die Demokratie? Zu den offensichtlich unbegründeten Verfassungsklagen gegen den Vertrag von Lissabon, in: integration 3/08, pp. 217-234, available at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/index.php?id=655 (last access 3 February 2009).
[10] Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council. 11 and 12 December 2008. Presidency Conclusions, 12 December 2008, 17271/08, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf(last access 3 February 2009).
[11] Reference and Research Services of the Deutscher Bundestag: Veränderungen in der Europäischen Union im Jahr 2009, Europa-Thema of 12 January 2009, Research Paper 02/09, available at: http://www.bundestag.de/wissen/analysen/2009/veraenderungen_in_der_eu_2009.pdf (last access 3 February 2009).
[12] For an overview over the parties’ preparations for the European elections in Germany and further links see, for example, the following websites: http://www.wahlen-europa.de/, http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/europawahl/index.php, or http://www.cep.eu/europawahl2009.html (last access 3 February 2009).
[13] Gerd Langguth: Warum Seehofer plötzlich Gefallen an Volksabstimmungen findet, in: spiegel online, 18 January 2009, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,600617,00.html (last access 3 February 2009); Albert Schäffer: Banger Blick auf die Europawahl, in: FAZ.net, 12 January 2009, available at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E209176357EEE4E22BC1709FC7BFCACC0~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access 3 February 2009).
[14] Cf. the parliamentary debate on Steinmeier’s government declaration of 18 December 2008, see Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, pp. 21128(A)-21151(C), here p. 21131(C), available at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 February 2009). See also spiegel online: EU-Gipfel senkt Ziele für Konjunkturpaket, 12 December 2008, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,595977,00.html (last access 3 February 2009); Nikolas Busse: EU strebt zweites Referendum in Irland an, in FAZ.net, 11 December 2008, available at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~E78978D5E2C64410DA14E9774BC6E178F~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access 3 February 2009).
[15] BDA – Bundesvereinigung der Deutschen Arbeitgeberverbände: euro-info No. 7, 16 December 2008, available at: http://www.arbeitgeber.de/www/arbeitgeber.nsf/res/Euro-Info7_08.pdf/$file/Euro-Info7_08.pdf (last access 3 February 2009); BDI/BDA The German Business Representation: BDI/BDA Brüssel Aktuell, No. 11, 19 December 2008, availabe at: http://www.bdi-online.de/BDIONLINE_INEAASP/iFILE.dll/XC918DA0597D549CDAD350C17D5EF90D3/2F252102116711D5A9C0009027D62C80/PDF/Br%FCssel_Aktuell_11_2008.PDF (last access 3 February 2009).
[16] See also chapter IV “The jubilee and memorial year 2009 and the shadows of elections” in this issue.
[17] Financial Times Deutschland: Obama und McCain liegen gleich auf, 25. August 2008, available at: http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/:US_Umfrage_Obama_und_McCain_liegen_gleichauf/405201.html (last access: 30 January 2009).
[18] Angela Merkel, Pressemitteilung, Bundeskanzlerin online, 07. November 2008, available at: www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/pressemitteilungen/BP (last access: 30 January 2009).
[19] Angela Merkel as quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Obama ruft eine Ära des Dienens aus, 20. January 2009.
[20] Eckart von Kleaden: Mit Europas Ausreden ist es bei Obama vorbei, CDU/CSU Bundestagsfraktion online, 08. November 2008, available at: www.von-klaeden.de/portal (last access: 30 January 2009).
[21] Ruprecht Polenz: Er wird auf die Verbündeten zugehen, Interview, Deutschlandradio, 05. November 2008, available at: www.dradio.de/dkultur/semdungen/interview.de (last access: 30 January 2009).
[22] Eckart von Kleaden, 08. November 2008.
[23] RP online: Polenz: Obama soll Nahost-Konflikt als erstes angehen, 28. December 2008, available at: http://www.rp-online.de/public/article/politik/deutschland/654824/Polenz-Obama-soll-Nahost-Konflikt-als-erstes-angehen.html (last access: 30 January 2009).
[24] Deutschlandradio, 05. November 2008.
[25] CDU/CSU – Bundestagsfraktion (2009): Positionspapier der CDU/CSU – Bundestagsfraktion. Beschluss vom 20. January 2009, available at: http://www.von-klaeden.de/ (last access: 30 January 2009).
[26] CDU/CSU – Bundestagsfraktion (2009), p. 4.
[27] CDU/CSU – Bundestagsfraktion (2009), p. 5.
[28] Frank-Walter Steinmeier: Im Engen Schulterschluss. Offener Brief von Außenminister Frank-Walter Steinmeier an Barack Obama, 12. January 2009, in: Der Spiegel, Nr. 3/2009, Hamburg: Spiegel-Verlag (German Version). The English version is available from the SPD website: http://www.frank-walter-steinmeier.de/aktuell/namensbeitraege/090112_obama-brief.html (last access: 30 January 2009).
[29] DPA News agency: Germany to Obama: We Will Resist Calls for More Troops, Deutsche Welle online, 09. November 2008, available at: www.dw-world.de/ (last access: 30 January 2009).
[30] Frank-Walter Steinmeier, 12. January 2009.
[31] Carsten Volkery: Der Überzeugungstäter der SPD, Spiegel online, 04. February 2008, available at: www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland (last access: 30 January 2009).
[32] Karsten Voigt (2008): Die Wahlen in den USA und die Zukunft des deutsch-amerikanischen Verhältnisses, in: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik, ZFAS (1), Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 6-15.
[33] Karsten Voigt (2008).
[34] Karsten Voigt (2008).
[35] The authors of the document are: Ex-chancellor Helmut Schmidt (SPD), Ex-Bundespräsident Richard von Weizsäcker (CDU), foreign affairs expert Egon Bahr (SPD), and Ex-Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Gentscher (FDP). It was printed in the Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung on 09. January 2009.
[36] Guido Westerwelle: Abrüstung muss wieder zu einem Kernbestandteil deutscher Außenpolitik werden, Portal Liberal, 09. January 2009, available at: www.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php (last access: 30 January 2009).
[37] Werner Hoyer: Barack Obama wird 44. US-President – Change has come to America, Portal Liberal, 07. November 2008, available at: www.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php (last access: 30 January 2009).
[38] Werner Hoyer: Hoyer begrüßt Wandel in der US-Außenpolitik unter Obama, Portal Liberal, 26. November 2008, available at: www.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php (last access: 30 January 2009).
[39] Claudia Roth and Reinhard Bütikofer: Eine historische Wahl, Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen, Presse-Info, 05. November 2008, available at: www.grüne.de (last access: 30 January 2009).
[40] Rainder Steenblock: Obama braucht die Europäer, das weiß er, Interview, Deutsche Welle, 06. November 2008, available at: www.dw-world.de (last access: 30 January 2009).
[41] Helmut Scholz: Realismus ist angebracht, Die Linke online, 05. November 2008, available at: www.die-linke.de/politik/international/detail/artikel (last access: 30 January 2009).
[42] Wulf Schmiese: Streit in Berlin, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 22. January 2009, p. 2.
[43] Frankfurter Rundschau: Deutschland will enge Partnerschaft mit Obama, Frankfurter Rundschau online, 05. November 2008, available at: www.fr-online.de/in_und_ausland/politik/dosseirs/spezial_us_wahl (last access: 30 January 2009).
[44] Deutsche Welle: Germany has doubts about Obama’s Green Commitment, Deutsche Welle online, 06. November 2008, available at: www.dw-world.de (last access: 30 January 2009).
[45] Stefan Fröhlich (2009): Außenpolitik unter Obama – pragmatischer Multilateralismus und transatlantische Annäherungen, in: intergration 1/2009, Berlin: Institut für Europäische Politik, pp. 3-16.
[46] Stefan Fröhlich (2009), p. 7.
[47] Stefan Fröhlich (2009), p. 15 ff.
[48] Peter Rudolf (2008): Amerikas neuer globaler Führungsanspruch. Außenpolitik unter Obama, SWP-Aktuell 77, November 2008, Berlin: SWP.
[49] Financial Times: Poll shows EU resistance on Afghan war, FT.com online, 19. January 2009, available at: www.ft.com/cms.com (last access: 30 January 2009).
[50] Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU).
[51] Angela Merkel in the parliamentary debate on the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008, in: Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/193, pp. 20683 (C)-20687 (C), here p. 20684 (A), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16193.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[52] Ibid., p. 20684 (B).
[53] European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Council. A European Economic Recovery Plan, COM (2008) 800, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0800:FIN:EN:PDF (last access: 25 February 2009).
[54] Angela Merkel in the parliamentary debate on European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008, in: Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/193, pp. 20683 (C)-20687 (C), here p. 20684 (B), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16193.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[55] Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD).
[56] Stefan Theil: Germany’s Frau Nein. The world’s policymakers say big spending packages will spur growth. But the leader of Europe’s biggest economy says she’s done enough already, in: Newsweek, 15 December 2008, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172619 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[57] Frank-Walter Steinmeier in the parliamentary debate on the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008, in: Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, pp. 21128 (B)-21132 (A), here p. 21129 (D), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[58] Carsten Volkery: EU-Wirtschaftspakt: Kanzlerkandidat treibt Kanzlerin, Spiegel Online, 13 November 2008, available at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,590293,00.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[59] „Europäischer Zukunftspakt für Arbeit“, available at: http://www.spd.de/de/pdf/material/131108_EU_Zukunftspakt.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[60] Ibid.
[61] Peer Steinbrück, Federal Minister of Finance, in an interview with Reinhold Beckmann, in: ARD: beckmann, 27 October 2008, minute 41:25-42:40, available at: http://www.daserste.de/beckmann/sendung_dyn~uid,exe47b6c7gbesrqhz7jx7z77~cm.asp (last access: 25 February 2009).
[62] Stefan Thiel: ‘It Doesn’t Exist!’. Germany’s outspoken finance minister on the hopeless search for ‘the Great Rescue Plan.’, Newsweek, 15 December 2008, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172613 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[63] Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP).
[64] Werner Hoyer in the parliamentary debate on the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008, in: Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, pp. 21132 (B)-21133 (D), here p. 21132 (C-D), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[65] Die Linke.
[66] Oskar Lafontaine in the parliamentary debate on the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008, in: Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, pp. 21135 (C)-21137 (C), here p. 21135 (C)-21136 (A), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[67] Bündnis 90/Die Grünen.
[68] Renate Künast in the parliamentary debate on the European Council on 11 and 12 December 2008, in: Bundestagsplenarprotokoll 16/196, pp. 21139 (B)-21141 (A), here pp. 21140 (C)-21141 (A), available at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[69] Martin Koopmann: Die Europäische Union in der Finanzmarktkrise. Gelungenes Krisenmanagement – strategische Defizite, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analysen und Argumente No. 56, 3 December 2008, available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544-1-30.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[70] Jutta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weckruf für die EU, in: Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner (eds.): Globale Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21-26, here p. 21, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[71] Martin Koopmann: Die Europäische Union in der Finanzmarktkrise. Gelungenes Krisenmanagement – strategische Defizite, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analysen und Argumente No. 56, 3 December 2008, p. 4, available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544-1-30.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[72] See French Council Presidency: Summit on the international financial crisis, 4 October 2008, available at: http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-04.10.2008/sommet_crise_financiere_internationale (last access: 25 February 2009).
[73] See Council of the European Union: 2894th Council meeting Economic and Financial Affairs, press release, Doc. 13784/08 (Presse 279), 7 October 2008, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/103250.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[74] See French Council Presidency: Summit of the euro area countries: declaration on a concerted European action plan of the euro area countries, 12 October 2008, available at: http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-12.10.2008/sommet_pays_zone_euro_declaration_plan_action_concertee (last access: 25 February 2009); Council of the European Union: Summit of the Euro Area countries – Declaration on a concerted European Action Plan of the Euro Area countries, Doc. 14239/08, 14 October 2008, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st14/st14239.en08.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[75] Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council 15 and 16 October 2008. Presidency Conclusions, Doc. 14368/08, 16 October 2008, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/103441.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[76] Jutta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weckruf für die EU, in: Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner (eds.): Globale Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21-26, here p. 21, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 February 2009). See as well: Daniela Schwarzer: Zehn Jahre Governance der Eurozone: ökonomische Bilanz und institutionelle Dynamiken jenseits der Vertragsrevisionen, in: integration 1/2009, pp. 17-32, here pp. 27-28, available at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/integration_2009/volltext/schwarzer1-09.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[77] Martin Koopmann: Die Europäische Union in der Finanzmarktkrise. Gelungenes Krisenmanagement – strategische Defizite, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analysen und Argumente No. 56, 3 December 2008, p. 3, available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544-1-30.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[78] Werner Becker: Die Währungsunion im Reifetest der Finanzkrise, Deutsche Bank Research (ed.): Aktueller Kommentar, 29 October 2008, p. 1, available at: http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000233153.pdf (last access 25 February 2009).
[79] Ibid. p. 1-2.
[80] Norbert Röttgen: Europa in der Finanzkrise dank des Euro gut gerüstet, press release, 15 February 2008, available at: http://www.cducsu.de/Titel__Thema_des_Tages_Europa_in_der_Finanzkrise_dank_des_Euros_gut_geruestet/TabID__1/SubTabID__5/InhaltTypID__4/InhaltID__8904/Inhalte.aspx (last access: 25 February 2009).
[81] Heribert Dieter: Managing the Financial Crisis – Is Europe Getting It Right?, SWP Comment 6/2009, pp. 1-2, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5774 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[82] Hans-Werner Sinn in an interview, in: FAZ.NET: “Wir sollten uns nicht verrückt machen lassen”, 12 October 2008, available at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub58241E4DF1B149538ABC24D0E82A6266/Doc~E494F421C10D94F9C9E45520367479B7E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[83] Jutta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weckruf für die EU, in: Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner (eds.): Globale Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21-26, here p. 21, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[84] Martin Koopmann: Die Europäische Union in der Finanzmarktkrise. Gelungenes Krisenmanagement – strategische Defizite, in: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analysen und Argumente No. 56, 3 December 2008, p. 3, available at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544-1-30.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[85] Ibid., p. 4; Nicolaus Heinen: Wirtschaftspolitische Koordinierung in der EU hat ihre Belastungsprobe bestanden, Deutsche Bank Research (ed.): Aktueller Kommentar, 17 October 2008, available at: http://www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?addmenu=false&document=PROD0000000000233065&rdLeftMargin=10&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwdspl=0&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD$WIPO&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD (last access: 25 February 2009).
[86] Daniela Schwarzer: Zehn Jahre Governance der Eurozone: ökonomische Bilanz und institutionelle Dynamiken jenseits der Vertragsrevisionen, in: integration 1/2009, pp. 17-32, here pp. 29, available at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/integration_2009/volltext/schwarzer1-09.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[87] European Commission: Communication from the Commission to the European Council. A European Economic Recovery Plan, COM (2008) 800, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0800:FIN:EN:PDF (last access: 25 February 2009); Council of the European Union: Brussels European Council 11 and 12 December 2008. Presidency Conclusions, Doc. 17271/1/08, 13 February 2009, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/104692.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[88] Jutta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weckruf für die EU, in: Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner (eds.): Globale Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21-26, here p. 22, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[89] Daniela Schwarzer: Zehn Jahre Governance der Eurozone: ökonomische Bilanz und institutionelle Dynamiken jenseits der Vertragsrevisionen, in: integration 1/2009, pp. 17-32, here pp. 29, available at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/integration_2009/volltext/schwarzer1-09.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[90] Werner Abelshauser: Geschichte wiederholt sich nicht. Oder doch? Szenarien der Finanzmarktkrise, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaft 4/2008, pp. 565-576, here p. 575.
[91] Joscha Schmierer: Die globale Finanzkrise prüft die Gemeinschaft. EU in der Bewährungsprobe, Zwischenruf zur Aussenpolitik, without date, available at: http://www.boell.de/internationalepolitik/aussensicherheit/wirtschaft-5206.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[92] Hans-Werner Sinn in an interview, in: FAZ.NET: “Wir sollten uns nicht verrückt machen lassen”, 12 October 2008, available at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub58241E4DF1B149538ABC24D0E82A6266/Doc~E494F421C10D94F9C9E45520367479B7E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[93] Joscha Schmierer: Die globale Finanzkrise prüft die Gemeinschaft. EU in der Bewährungsprobe, Zwischenruf zur Aussenpolitik, without date, available at: http://www.boell.de/internationalepolitik/aussensicherheit/wirtschaft-5206.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[94] Hans-Werner Sinn in an interview, in: FAZ.NET: “Wir sollten uns nicht verrückt machen lassen”, 12 October 2008, available at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub58241E4DF1B149538ABC24D0E82A6266/Doc~E494F421C10D94F9C9E45520367479B7E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[95] Peer Steinbrück, Federal Minister of Finance, in an interview with Reinhold Beckmann, in: ARD: beckmann, 27 October 2008, minute 18:20-18:50, available at: http://www.daserste.de/beckmann/sendung_dyn~uid,exe47b6c7gbesrqhz7jx7z77~cm.asp (last access: 25 February 2009).
[96] Jörg Assmussen: Politische Antworten auf die Finanzmarktkrise, in: Neue Gesellschaft – Frankfurter Hefte 11/2008, pp. 12-15, here p. 15.
[97] Council of the European Union: 2822nd Council meeting Economic and Financial Affairs, press release, Doc. 13571/07 (Presse 217), 9 October 2008, pp. 22-29, available at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/96375.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009); for an updated version see: Council of the European Union: Financial Markets Stability Roadmaps, Doc. 9056/1/08, 15 May 2008, available at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09056-re01.en08.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[98] Financial Stability Forum: Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience, 7 April 2008, available at: http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0804.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009); for the progress in the implementation see Financial Stability Forum: Report of the Financial Stability Forum on Enhancing Market and Institutional Resilience. Follow-up on Implementation, 10 October 2008, available at: http://www.fsforum.org/press/pr_081009f.pdf (last access: 25 February 2009).
[99] Heribert Dieter: Managing the Financial Crisis – Is Europe Getting It Right?, SWP Comment 6/2009, pp. 1-2, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5774 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[100] Ibid., p. 2.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Frank-Walter Steinmeier in his speech at the UN General Assembly, in: UN General Assembly: official records, 63rd session, 12th plenary meeting, 26 September 2008, Doc. A/63/PV.12, p. 47, available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/65/PDF/N0852265.pdf?OpenElement (last access: 25 February 2008).
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid., p. 48.
[105] Stefan Thiel: ‘It Doesn’t Exist!’. Germany’s outspoken finance minister on the hopeless search for ‘the Great Rescue Plan.’, Newsweek, 15 December 2008, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172613 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[106] Peer Steinbrück: “Wie viel Vertrauen verdienen die Finanzmärkte?”, press release, 13 November 2008, available at: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/DE/Presse/Reden_20und_20Interviews/102__RedeGDV__13112008.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[107] Jörg Assmussen, secretary of state in the German Federal Ministry of Finance, in the discussion “Ansätze zur Finanzmarktregulierung” organised by the “Managerkreis der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung” on 4 December 2008 in Berlin.
[108] Peer Steinbrück: “Wie viel Vertrauen verdienen die Finanzmärkte?”, press release, 13 November 2008, available at: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/DE/Presse/Reden_20und_20Interviews/102__RedeGDV__13112008.html (last access: 25 February 2009).
[109] Stefan Thiel: ‘It Doesn’t Exist!’. Germany’s outspoken finance minister on the hopeless search for ‘the Great Rescue Plan.’, Newsweek, 15 December 2008, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172613 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[110] Frank-Walter Steinmeier in his speech at the UN General Assembly, in: UN General Assembly: official records, 63rd session, 12th plenary meeting, 26 September 2008, Doc. A/63/PV.12, p. 48, available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/65/PDF/N0852265.pdf?OpenElement (last access: 25 February 2008).
[111] Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner: Einleitung, in: Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner (eds.): Globale Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 7-12, here p. 12, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[112] Werner Abelshauser: Geschichte wiederholt sich nicht. Oder doch? Szenarien der Finanzmarktkrise, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawissenschaft 4/2008, pp. 565-576, here p. 570.
[113] Problemstellung und Schlussfolgerungen, in: Hanns Günther Hilpert/Stormy Mildner (eds.): Globale Ordnungspolitik am Scheideweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanzmarktkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 5-6, here p. 6, available at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 February 2009).
[114] Frank-Walter Steinmeier in his speech at the UN General Assembly, in: UN General Assembly: official records, 63rd session, 12th plenary meeting, 26 September 2008, Doc. A/63/PV.12, p. 48, available at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/65/PDF/N0852265.pdf?OpenElement (last access: 25 February 2008).