Continuation of ratification process welcomed

1. How does the future of the EU after the Irish ‘No’ look like?

 

After the Euro­pean Coun­cil meet­ing in Decem­ber 2008 which has been dom­i­nat­ed by eco­nom­ic and ener­gy issues, the future of the EU seems to be regard­ed quite opti­misti­cal­ly in Ger­many. Espe­cial­ly the prospect of Ire­land hold­ing a sec­ond ref­er­en­dum on the Lis­bon Treaty before the end of the Euro­pean Commission’s term of office has been warm­ly wel­comed. The Ger­man For­eign Min­is­ter, Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier, “was in con­fi­dent mood: ‘Togeth­er with our Irish friends, we have agreed on a process which will allow a new ref­er­en­dum in Ire­land and enable the Treaty to enter into force at the end of 2009’”.[1] This agree­ment, reached at the Euro­pean Coun­cil meeting,[2] is most­ly seen as a con­tin­u­a­tion of the rat­i­fi­ca­tion process, and there is not much dis­cus­sion about the con­se­quences of a sec­ond ‘No’ vote.[3] The only par­ty in the Ger­man par­lia­ment scep­ti­cal of a sec­ond ref­er­en­dum is the Left Par­ty (“Die Linke”), argu­ing that such a pro­ce­dure is every­thing but democratic.[4] The Left is also the only par­ty in the Ger­man par­lia­ment argu­ing for a stop of the cur­rent rat­i­fi­ca­tion process,[5] hav­ing also vot­ed against the law approv­ing of the Lis­bon Treaty.[6]

The par­lia­men­tary rat­i­fi­ca­tion of the Lis­bon Treaty in Ger­many had been com­plet­ed in May 2008.[7] Mean­while, the Fed­er­al Pres­i­dent, Horst Köh­ler, has approved of the respec­tive laws, which are now pub­lished in the Fed­er­al Law Gazette.[8] Köh­ler still waits, though, to sign the rat­i­fi­ca­tion bill until the fed­er­al con­sti­tu­tion­al court (‘Bun­desver­fas­sungs­gericht’) has returned a ver­dict on the appeals against the Lis­bon Treaty. The hear­ings were held on the 10 and 11 Feb­ru­ary 2009.[9]

As also agreed on at the Euro­pean Coun­cil meet­ing in Decem­ber 2008, the Euro­pean elec­tions will take place accord­ing to the rules of the Nice Treaty.[10] Should the Lis­bon Treaty enter into force, the num­ber of MEPs for mem­ber states hav­ing more MEPs accord­ing to the rules of the Lis­bon Treaty will be increased accord­ing­ly. Yet, Ger­many (the only mem­ber state hav­ing few­er MEPs accord­ing to the rules of the Lis­bon Treaty) will keep its three addi­tion­al MEPs, as it has been agreed that the num­ber of MEPs will rise from 736 to 754 dur­ing the 2009–2014 leg­isla­tive peri­od of the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment if the Lis­bon Treaty enters into force.[11] Maybe this is the rea­son why there is not much dis­cus­sion about this, nei­ther in the par­ties nor in the press.

All Ger­man par­ties are in the process of set­ting up their lists, choos­ing their can­di­dates, and draft­ing their pro­grammes for the com­ing Euro­pean elec­tions in June 2009. All this seems to be busi­ness as usual.[12] Only in Bavaria, where the CSU, the sis­ter par­ty of the CDU, has its own list, there is some ‘com­mo­tion’ as the par­ty has to ensure to reach the Ger­man-wide thresh­old of 5 per­cent. This might be dif­fi­cult as the par­ty lost a lot of votes in the last state par­lia­ment elec­tions in Sep­tem­ber 2008 and because in oth­er Ger­man states (‘Län­der’), local elec­tions will be held on the same day as the Euro­pean elections.[13]

With regard to the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion, the deci­sion tak­en at the Euro­pean Coun­cil meet­ing in Decem­ber 2008 to keep the prin­ci­ple of ‘one com­mis­sion­er per mem­ber state’ is pitied, although wide­ly regard­ed as nec­es­sary to ensure that Ire­land is able to hold a sec­ond referendum.[14] This view is also expressed, for exam­ple, by the “Con­fed­er­a­tion of Ger­man Employ­ers’ Asso­ci­a­tions” (BDA) and the “Fed­er­a­tion of Ger­man Indus­tries” (BDI).[15] Oth­er­wise, the appoint­ment of a new Euro­pean Com­mis­sion is, so far, not very much discussed.

The fact that issues about the future of the EU do not receive much atten­tion so far might be due to the upcom­ing gen­er­al elec­tions in Ger­many which will take place in Sep­tem­ber 2009. As a new Ger­man gov­ern­ment con­stel­la­tion might entail new offi­cial Ger­man posi­tions on such issues, it remains to be seen how the var­i­ous par­ties score in the Euro­pean elec­tions, in the var­i­ous state and local elec­tions, and espe­cial­ly in the gen­er­al elections.[16]

 

2. Transatlantic relations renewed after President Bush: top priorities

 

Transatlantic relations with Obama: renewed but not reinvented

The new pres­i­dent-elect of the Unit­ed States of Amer­i­ca, Barack Oba­ma, was also the favourite can­di­date of the major­i­ty of Ger­mans. In fact, the Finan­cial Times Deutsch­land, in coop­er­a­tion with the opin­ion research insti­tute For­sa, found out that Oba­ma would win three quar­ters of all votes if the Ger­mans were his electorate.[17] Thus, sup­port for his agen­da is wide­spread but also fuelled by high expectations.

Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Angela Merkel, from the Chris­t­ian Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty (CDU), offered close coop­er­a­tion to the new­ly elect­ed Amer­i­can Pres­i­dent. In a phone call to Oba­ma, she point­ed in par­tic­u­lar to “the chal­lenges that the inter­na­tion­al com­mu­ni­ty is fac­ing”, such as the Iran­ian nuclear pro­gramme, the sta­bil­i­sa­tion of Afghanistan, the cli­mate change and the finan­cial crisis.[18] In reac­tion to Obama’s pres­i­den­tial speech, Merkel expressed that she “antic­i­pates more mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism from now on.” How­ev­er, the expec­ta­tions on the new Pres­i­dent are extreme­ly high and one should not for­get that he is ‘only a human’ too.[19]

Her par­ty col­league and spokesper­son for for­eign pol­i­cy affairs of the fac­tion in the Ger­man Bun­destag, Eckart von Klae­den, under­lined the points she men­tioned but also warned that the “times of excus­es from Europe” have end­ed with Oba­ma. This means that if Europe is call­ing for more con­sul­ta­tion from the Amer­i­can side in inter­na­tion­al affairs, it should be pre­pared to “act effec­tive­ly”. From a Ger­man per­spec­tive, this refers espe­cial­ly to the com­mit­ment in Afghanistan. While von Klae­den does not think that Obama’s first action in office will be to call for more Ger­man troops to the war zone, he stress­es the impor­tance of com­bin­ing mil­i­tary and civ­il operations.[20] Also, Ruprecht Polenz, head of the For­eign Affairs Com­mit­tee and mem­ber of the CDU, sup­ports this view: One should not only con­cen­trate on the mil­i­tary aspect of the engage­ment in Afghanistan. Instead, he says, it is impor­tant to sta­bilise the coun­try and the region. This includes civ­il recon­struc­tion efforts but also polit­i­cal dia­logue with the neigh­bours, such as Pakistan.[21] Indi­rect­ly, this could be seen as a con­ces­sion to Obama.

How­ev­er, to make this ‘effec­tive mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism’ work, von Klae­den argues that nei­ther the USA can attempt to under­take strate­gic inter­na­tion­al oper­a­tions on their own, nor can Europe decline its respon­si­bil­i­ties. Espe­cial­ly in regions of the world where Europe’s pres­tige is bet­ter than that of the USA, like in the East or Mid­dle East, chances for com­mon suc­cess are high­er. More­over, the EU has built up exten­sive resources and exper­tise in the field of civ­il cri­sis man­age­ment and recon­struc­tion, which can serve as an impor­tant attribute to achieve the above.[22] Nonethe­less, the out­stand­ing com­mit­ment of the USA in the Mid­dle East will not cease with the new Pres­i­dent. This is why Polenz called on Oba­ma to put the con­flict on top of his pri­or­i­ty list.[23] More­over, Polenz is con­vinced that the transat­lantic rela­tion­ship will expe­ri­ence a “return of diplo­ma­cy” with Oba­ma, who is expect­ed to accom­mo­date his allies more than his pre­de­ces­sor. Yet, nobody will ask for per­mis­sion from Europe. There will rather be a com­mon con­clu­sion from the analy­sis of a prob­lem, which then also demands com­mon action. This will have con­se­quences for Ger­many and Europe. In con­clu­sion, his style of pol­i­cy will be more demanding.[24]

Just on the day of Obama’s inau­gu­ra­tion, the CDU/CSU fac­tion on the Ger­man Bun­destag pub­lished a strate­gic paper called “For a clos­er transat­lantic partnership”.[25] In this paper, they high­light again the pri­or­i­ties of their par­ty and invit­ed Oba­ma to explore new ways in the eco­nom­ic, envi­ron­men­tal, secu­ri­ty, and for­eign pol­i­cy togeth­er with Europe. The paper explic­it­ly encour­ages the new Amer­i­can admin­is­tra­tion to join the Kyoto Pro­to­col and nego­ti­ate fur­ther steps.[26] Addi­tion­al­ly, the CDU/CSU fac­tion stressed the impor­tance of NATO as cen­tral instru­ment of the transat­lantic secu­ri­ty and defence pol­i­cy. A new con­cept is need­ed to adapt this alliance to the glob­al chal­lenges, which are no longer geo­graph­i­cal­ly con­fined. This is also seen as a task for the EU.[27]

The open let­ter from For­eign Min­is­ter Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier to Pres­i­dent Oba­ma, which was pub­lished in Der Spiegel mag­a­zine on 12 Jan­u­ary 2009, can part­ly be read as a state­ment as can­di­date for chan­cel­lor­ship of his Social Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty (SPD).[28] Nonethe­less, this let­ter address­es a num­ber of issues that can gen­er­al­ly be seen as top pri­or­i­ties for a future transat­lantic rela­tion­ship from a Ger­man gov­ern­ment per­spec­tive. The actu­al rank­ing of these pri­or­i­ties might how­ev­er dif­fer, depend­ing on who is artic­u­lat­ing them.

Thus, Stein­meier framed his pri­or­i­ties in three broad cat­e­gories: 1) ‘Work­ing togeth­er in con­flict regions’; 2) ‘Work­ing towards secu­ri­ty in both East and West’; and 3) ‘For a glob­al com­mu­ni­ty of shared respon­si­bil­i­ty’. In the fol­low­ing sub-themes he wel­comes Obama’s announce­ment to close the prison camps in Guan­tanamo and pleads for alter­na­tive solu­tions in the fight against ter­ror­ism. Rather than mil­i­tary force, it would be more effec­tive to sup­port eco­nom­ic devel­op­ment and cre­ate ‘life-per­spec­tives to help peo­ple find their way out of pover­ty’. The Mid­dle East, Iran, Iraq and espe­cial­ly Afghanistan, serve as exam­ples in this point. Read­ing between the lines, it seems obvi­ous that Stein­meier does not want to upset Oba­ma by refus­ing addi­tion­al com­mit­ment in any of these con­flict zones. On the oth­er hand, he also does not want to be asso­ci­at­ed with sup­port for these wars, since they are high­ly unpop­u­lar with the Ger­man electorate.[29]

For the sec­ond cat­e­go­ry, Stein­meier points at the need to re-think the role and mis­sion of NATO, but also stress­es the respon­si­bil­i­ty of the USA and Rus­sia to help coun­ter­ing the pro­lif­er­a­tion of nuclear weapons. With regards to the third cat­e­go­ry, he recalled the world finan­cial sum­mit in Wash­ing­ton as a new start to inte­grate “new pow­ers” into a glob­al sys­tem of respon­si­bil­i­ty, which expands beyond finan­cial issues. Cli­mate pro­tec­tion and ener­gy secu­ri­ty were men­tioned as addi­tion­al key top­ics in this regard.[30]

Notwith­stand­ing the Steinmeier’s posi­tion, Hans-Ulrich Klose from the SPD fac­tion in the Ger­man Bun­destag open­ly voic­es his belief, accord­ing to which Ger­many should take over the Quick Reac­tion Force and “make it strong enough so that it can be deployed in Afghanistan- also in the South”. Klose is well known for his dis­sent­ing views and as an Amer­i­ca-friend­ly tansatlanticists.[31] Karsten Voigt (also SPD), coor­di­na­tor for Ger­man-Amer­i­can coop­er­a­tion in the For­eign Min­istry, warned the Euro­peans already dur­ing the cam­paigns of Oba­ma and McCain that no mat­ter who will win the elec­tions, and despite the acknowl­edged rel­e­vance of mul­ti­lat­er­al coop­er­a­tion from both sides, mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism will nev­er have the same impor­tance for the USA as for Germany.[32] This can only be under­stood under the “con­sti­tu­tion­al polit­i­cal tra­di­tion” of the Unit­ed States, its “world pow­er sta­tus”, and its “polit­i­cal culture”.[33]

Nonethe­less, Voigt sees great poten­tial for transat­lantic coop­er­a­tion, but Europe will have to play its part. Themes that he men­tions as being vital and maybe most sen­si­tive for this part­ner­ship include the fight against ter­ror­ism, real­i­sa­tion of a peace order in the Mid­dle East, the geo-polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic chal­lenges through emerg­ing pow­ers, and the con­flicts in Afghanistan, the Balkan region, Africa and Asia. The cur­rent finan­cial cri­sis also makes it indis­pens­able to think about a new transat­lantic eco­nom­ic part­ner­ship. Pro­tec­tion­ist mea­sures as often advo­cat­ed by the Democ­rats would harm Ger­many as an export­ing nation espe­cial­ly. For the EU-Amer­i­can rela­tion­ship, Voigt iden­ti­fies two major tasks: First of all, it is nec­es­sary to find a com­mon stance on mea­sures to meet the cli­mate change and to ensure ener­gy secu­ri­ty. Sec­ond­ly, and this at least for Europe is some­how con­nect­ed to the lat­ter point, both have to come to terms with Rus­sia. Being an essen­tial polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic part­ner, and also a direct neigh­bour for Europe, Amer­i­ca should not attempt to make the devel­op­ment of transat­lantic coop­er­a­tion depend­ing on Europe’s rela­tion­ship with Russia.[34]

Gui­do West­er­welle, leader of the Lib­er­al Par­ty (FDP), men­tioned “nuclear dis­ar­ma­ment” as major point when sketch­ing his vision for a new Ger­man for­eign pol­i­cy in view of the changes in Amer­i­ca. In doing so, he took ref­er­ence to a joint dec­la­ra­tion of four out­stand­ing Ger­man “elder statesman”[35] who plead­ed for “a world with­out nuclear threats”. This in turn was a reac­tion to an appeal issued by four elder states­men from the USA in 2007, who also called for a “world free of atom­ic weapons”.[36]

Wern­er Hoy­er, spokesper­son for for­eign affairs of the FDP fac­tion in the Ger­man Bun­destag, for­mu­lat­ed the inter­na­tion­al chal­lenges ahead as to “over­come a giant cri­sis of trust”, which does not stop at the finan­cial mar­kets and the eco­nom­ic poli­cies. Rather it has to recon­sid­er the “fun­da­men­tal val­ues and prin­ci­ples of polit­i­cal action that once made the USA strong and were the basis for its inter­na­tion­al attractiveness”.[37] In this, Hoy­er sees a chance for Europe, togeth­er with the USA, to re-define “the West”, which includes a clear hint at America’s iso­lat­ed stand­ing on Guan­tanamo and Abu Ghraib. Fur­ther­more, he cites the finan­cial cri­sis as a top­ic that needs to be tack­led – togeth­er with the emerg­ing economies of the South and East. The G20 Sum­mit in Wash­ing­ton thus pos­es a promis­ing start­ing point. Final­ly, he puts the rel­e­vance and future of NATO on the dis­cus­sion table, too. Hoy­er expects clos­er coop­er­a­tion from the new US gov­ern­ment with the oth­er NATO mem­bers, and inter­prets the announce­ment of the US-For­eign Min­istry to push no longer for Georgia’s hasty admis­sion to the Mem­ber­ship Action Plan as a pos­i­tive sign “bear­ing Obama’s handwriting”.[38]

The lead­ers of the Green Par­ty (Bünd­nis 90/Die Grü­nen), Clau­dia Roth and Rein­hard Bütikofer, explained that their pri­or­i­ty is a transat­lantic ini­tia­tive in the area of cli­mate and ener­gy policy.[39] Where­as Rain­der Steen­block (mem­ber of the Ger­man Bun­destag for the Greens) in his posi­tion as OSCE elec­tion observ­er not­ed that the social cli­mate in Ger­many might change when the new US-gov­ern­ment is going to pur­sue dif­fer­ent polit­i­cal aims. This will also have an effect on Germany’s readi­ness to devel­op a com­mon strat­e­gy for Afghanistan togeth­er with the US, which even­tu­al­ly will soft­en Germany’s resis­tance to any addi­tion­al deploy­ment of troops in Afghanistan. How­ev­er, this needs the respec­tive preconditions.[40] Hel­mut Schloz, mem­ber of the Left­ist Par­ty (Die Linke) exec­u­tive com­mit­tee, mere­ly asks Oba­ma to stick to his promises.[41]

One of the first actions in office of the new Pres­i­dent was to under­take steps to close the Guan­tanamo prison camps and to halt the mil­i­tary tri­als, as he promised. While the move as such was wel­comed by all polit­i­cal par­ties, it soon evolved into to dis­cus­sion about Germany’s oblig­a­tion to accept ex-pris­on­ers. Wolf­gang Schäubele, CDU Min­is­ter for the Inte­ri­or, sees the “human­i­tar­i­an respon­si­bil­i­ty” to care for an “accept­able future of the pris­on­ers” with the US gov­ern­ment and is not of the opin­ion that Ger­many gen­er­al­ly should host any of them. For­eign Min­is­ter Stein­meier, also in his role as pres­i­den­tial can­di­date for the SPD, already offered that Ger­many could think about such a step.[42] The last word has not been spo­ken and the issue will remain part of the ongo­ing debate.

But not only politi­cians are plac­ing great hopes on the new pres­i­dent-elect. Also, civ­il soci­ety groups are hop­ing that Oba­ma will set pos­i­tive trends nation­al­ly but also on the inter­na­tion­al scale. Michael Som­mer, Chief of the Con­fed­er­a­tion of Ger­man Trade Unions (DGB), for exam­ple, is talk­ing about a “good sign for employ­ees” as they might enjoy bet­ter social rights from now on. And Jür­gen Thur­mann, Pres­i­dent of the Indus­tri­al Union, claims stronger ties between the Euro­pean and Amer­i­can econ­o­my to for­mu­late and enforce joint answers to the glob­al challenges.[43] Envi­ron­men­tal groups in Ger­many are plac­ing high expec­ta­tions on the new pres­i­dent as well. The green group BUND pos­tu­lates that the US “like all oth­er indus­tri­al­ized coun­tries” has to “move to a sus­tain­able eco­nom­ic mod­el”. And the envi­ron­men­tal group NABU is hope­ful that “an Oba­ma admin­is­tra­tion would have a fun­da­men­tal­ly dif­fer­ent approach to cli­mate pro­tec­tion than out­go­ing US Pres­i­dent Bush”.[44]

How­ev­er, Ger­man researchers who analyse the prospects of a new transat­lantic rela­tion­ship are scep­ti­cal about the real impact that the new Pres­i­dent Oba­ma will and can have. Sim­i­lar to Karsten Voigt, Ste­fan Fröh­lich from the Uni­ver­si­ty of Erlan­gen-Nürn­berg, stress­es America’s dif­fer­ent approach to the con­cept of mul­ti­lat­er­al­ism. While he does think that there will be more transat­lantic coop­er­a­tion, he assumes that it will be more “instrumental”.[45] Mean­ing that Wash­ing­ton will decide from case to case whether and how it will con­sult with part­ners. Fröh­lich also sug­gests, that those part­ners do not always have to be Euro­pean. More­over, inter­na­tion­al coop­er­a­tion in the under­stand­ing of US politi­cians has a strong con­no­ta­tion of “bur­den shar­ing”. It can be expect­ed that Oba­ma is going to try to rebuild the image of Amer­i­ca as the “friend­ly hege­mon”. Yet, this also implies that allies are need­ed to share the unpleas­ant tasks. These assump­tions are under­lined by Obama’s promise to dou­ble Amer­i­can for­eign aid on the one hand, and his announce­ment to increase the defence bud­get and the num­ber of mil­i­tary troops.[46] More­over, Fröh­lich warns that high expec­ta­tions are like­ly to be dis­ap­point­ed. Read­ing the signs of Obama’s first polit­i­cal steps care­ful­ly, reveals that transat­lantic rela­tions are not nec­es­sar­i­ly on top of his list. In the end, “it was the econ­o­my that won the cam­paign” and not his pol­i­cy on Iraq. All togeth­er, Europe should expect a “prag­mat­ic” approach to the com­ing transat­lantic part­ner­ship. Nev­er­the­less, there will be oppor­tu­ni­ties for the EU to influ­ence and shape this agen­da. [47]

Most of the above men­tioned points are also shared by Peter Rudolf, head of the Amer­i­ca research group at the Ger­man Insti­tute for Inter­na­tion­al and Secu­ri­ty Affairs. In addi­tion, he under­lines the change in rhetoric that has tak­en place under Oba­ma. It can be expect­ed that he will make a greater effort to reha­bil­i­tate and use America’s ‘soft pow­er’. This also includes the instru­men­tal­i­sa­tion of ‘glob­al gov­er­nance insti­tu­tions’ to inte­grate emerg­ing pow­ers. Along with this goes the under­stand­ing that Amer­i­ca inhab­its a ‘nat­ur­al lead­er­ship role’ in organ­i­sa­tions, such as the UN. On the oth­er hand, Amer­i­ca is autonomous enough not to join the Inter­na­tion­al Court of Jus­tice and also Oba­ma remains scep­ti­cal in this ques­tion. He decid­ed to wait and watch for now.[48]

Over­all, it appears that the Afghanistan ques­tion will have a strong impact on the Ger­man-Amer­i­can and transat­lantic rela­tion­ship. An opin­ion poll pub­lished by the Finan­cial Times reveals that some 60 per­cent of the Ger­man pop­u­la­tion would not wish their gov­ern­ment to send more troops to Afghanistan “under any circumstances”.[49] How­ev­er, as can be fil­tered out from the con­tri­bu­tions above, it is most like­ly that Oba­ma will demand some sort of con­tri­bu­tion to this front from Europe. Thus, this issue will also be cru­cial for Ger­man-EU rela­tions and the role of the EU as a civ­il-mil­i­tary part­ner. Addi­tion­al­ly, the same opin­ion poll shows that “deal­ing with the inter­na­tion­al finan­cial cri­sis” is in the top range of Germany’s pri­or­i­ty list. How­ev­er, where­as near to 60 per­cent of Amer­i­cans sub­scribe to this point, only about 30 per­cent of Ger­mans do so. Con­se­quent­ly, this could lead to a con­flict of inter­est when oth­er issues are giv­en less atten­tion than expect­ed. Last but not least, the transat­lantic part­ner­ship will be deter­mined by Obama’s com­mit­ment to address envi­ron­men­tal issues respon­si­bly and sus­tain­able. In the short term, how­ev­er, many debates on all that in Ger­many will also be fought under the umbrel­la of the upcom­ing elec­tions. It will be inter­est­ing to see which issues gain top pri­or­i­ty once Ger­man pol­i­tics fol­low their busi­ness as usu­al and once Oba­ma has set­tled in his new office. One should not for­get, after all, that Oba­ma faces a seri­ous amount of chal­lenges at home, too.

3. Financial crisis and challenges of global governance: the EU response

 

United in economic diversity?

Before giv­ing an overview of the Ger­man debate about the Euro­pean Union’s role in the cur­rent eco­nom­ic and finan­cial cri­sis and the impli­ca­tions the cri­sis has for the glob­al eco­nom­ic and polit­i­cal pow­er con­stel­la­tion a short remark on the promi­nence of these top­ics in the gen­er­al Ger­man dis­course about the cri­sis has to be made. The top­ics touched here are less promi­nent in the pub­lic debate in Ger­many. Three oth­er ques­tions are fare more pre­vail­ing: 1) Is it nec­es­sary to bail out bank­rupt finan­cial insti­tu­tions? 2) Should the same be done for com­pa­nies active in the real econ­o­my? 3) How is the mon­ey to sup­port the econ­o­my effi­cient­ly spent and who receives which shares?

The eval­u­a­tion of the EU’s per­for­mance is often just a side aspect, but a gen­er­al trend can be iden­ti­fied among these state­ments. Most peo­ple par­tic­i­pat­ing take an inter­gou­vern­men­tal­ist view of the Euro­pean Union in the debate. The debate about long-term impli­ca­tions is even more restrict­ed to expert cir­cles. Most par­tic­i­pants agree that mul­ti­po­lar­i­sa­tion will be the major effect of the cur­rent crisis.

Europe – a continent petrified by the crisis?

Review­ing the French Coun­cil Pres­i­den­cy the Ger­man Chan­cel­lor, Angela Merkel (Chris­t­ian Democrats[50]), con­clud­ed that Europe has shown that a com­mon set of instru­ments and coor­di­nat­ed nation­al approach­es brought the finan­cial cri­sis part­ly under control.[51] Fur­ther­more, she argued that to cope with the eco­nom­ic cri­sis a com­mon approach is even more nec­es­sary than in the case of the finan­cial cri­sis. This com­mon approach has to be coor­di­nat­ed among all mem­ber states and not in any type of a Euro­pean sub­group, she said in a par­lia­men­tary debate. Thus, the Euro­pean Coun­cil could be regard­ed as an “eco­nom­ic gov­ern­ment of Europe”.[52] Merkel and out­spo­ken­ly the whole Ger­man fed­er­al gov­ern­ment sup­port the Euro­pean Commission’s “Euro­pean Eco­nom­ic Recov­ery Plan“[53] as going into the right direc­tion. But in the same debate Merkel called for lev­el-head­ed­ness. The Ger­man fed­er­al gov­ern­ment would take mea­sures ade­quate to the devel­op­ment of the eco­nom­ic cri­sis, but in a mid-term per­spec­tive all states had to com­ply with the rules of the Sta­bil­i­ty and Growth Pact.[54] This pol­i­cy of deficit spend­ing which keeps Peer Steinbrück’s, Social Democratic[55] Fed­er­al Min­is­ter of Finance, mid-term goal of hav­ing a bal­anced bud­get in mind, brought her soon crit­i­cism from many mem­ber states being “Germany’s Frau Nein”.[56]

Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier, Social Demo­c­ra­t­ic Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for For­eign Affairs, as a mem­ber of the Ger­man fed­er­al gov­ern­ment sup­ports Chan­cel­lor Merkel’s view, and argues that a ‘one size fits all’ approach would not be appro­pri­ate to stim­u­late the Euro­pean economies with their dif­fer­ent structures.[57] In his role as the Social Demo­c­ra­t­ic front run­ner in the fed­er­al par­lia­men­tary elec­tion in Sep­tem­ber 2009 Stein­meier empha­sis­es oth­er aspects.[58] In a strat­e­gy paper titled “Euro­pean future pact for employment”[59] pub­lished on 13 Novem­ber 2008 Stein­meier stress­es that the cit­i­zens of the Euro­pean Union, and the world, expect the Union to not only gen­er­ate new leg­is­la­tion, but also to act. The paper lists nine pro­pos­als from an inten­si­fied social dia­log to the claim that Europe should play a lead­ing role in restruc­tur­ing the glob­al finan­cial market.[60]

Stein­brück agrees with Chan­cel­lor Merkel on the Ger­man eco­nom­ic stim­uli pack­age and the gen­er­al pos­i­tive eval­u­a­tion of the Euro­pean Union’s per­for­mance. He does not see any deficits in Euro­pean coor­di­na­tion of fis­cal and eco­nom­ic pol­i­cy. The Coun­cil for Eco­nom­ic and Finan­cial Affairs would come close to a ‘Euro­pean eco­nom­ic gov­ern­ment’ and the Euro­pean Coun­cil could act in this role if nec­es­sary. He is strong­ly against the idea of the French Pres­i­dent Nico­las Sarkozy to install an eco­nom­ic gov­ern­ment of the Euro­zone. That would divide the Euro­pean Union in two class­es of mem­ber states.[61] Regard­ing the Euro­pean Union as a whole, Stein­brück is more crit­i­cal and iden­ti­fies a “lead­er­ship prob­lem” because “27 dif­fer­ent mem­bers […] have still not decid­ed on how to work with each other”[62].

The oppo­si­tion in the Ger­man fed­er­al par­lia­ment tries to stress much more its crit­i­cism con­cern­ing the per­for­mance of the Euro­pean Union and the fed­er­al gov­ern­ment. But its gen­er­al per­cep­tion of the Euro­pean Union is not so far away from the government’s point of view. Wern­er Hoy­er, Liberal[63] MP, doubts that the Euro­pean Union will be able to act effec­tive­ly in 2009 due to the Euro­pean elec­tions, the deci­sion about the new Euro­pean Com­mis­sion and a, accord­ing to Hoy­er, weak Czech Pres­i­den­cy. Thus, he con­cludes that the nation­al gov­ern­ments will be the cru­cial actors in the com­ing months. Mean­while the Ger­man Fed­er­al Min­is­ter of Finance weak­ened due to, accord­ing to Hoy­er, Germany’s stance on the Euro­pean lev­el by crit­i­cis­ing his col­leagues from oth­er mem­ber states. How­ev­er, he espe­cial­ly agrees with the ques­tion whether the Sta­bil­i­ty and Growth Pact should be applied in a strict or loose man­ner with the fed­er­al government’s Euro­pean policy.[64] Oskar Lafontaine from the Left Party[65] eval­u­ates the per­for­mance of the French Pres­i­den­cy very pos­i­tive­ly. He agrees with the French Pres­i­dent Sarkozy that the cur­rent chal­lenges the Euro­pean Union is fac­ing can­not be dealt with on a nation­al lev­el; a Euro­pean-wide answer had to be found. But accord­ing to him the Ger­man fed­er­al gov­ern­ment did every­thing it could to block a com­mon Euro­pean approach, but luck­i­ly did not suc­ceed. A sec­ond point of dis­agree­ment with posi­tion of the Ger­man fed­er­al gov­ern­ment, con­cerns the ques­tion of a ‘Euro­pean eco­nom­ic gov­ern­ment’. The Left Par­ty strong­ly favours this pro­pos­al of the French Presidency.[66] Accord­ing to Renate Künast, from the Green Party,[67] the name “Madame Non” is an appro­pri­ate descrip­tion of Chan­cel­lor Merkel’s pol­i­cy on the Euro­pean lev­el, which lacks any ini­tia­tive. The con­clu­sions of the Euro­pean Coun­cil are, from her point of view, a non suf­fi­cient response to the eco­nom­ic cri­sis. One cause for the inap­pro­pri­ate­ness of the mea­sures she iden­ti­fies is the fact that ten min­is­ters from dif­fer­ent Euro­pean mem­ber states have eight dif­fer­ent opinions.[68]

While politi­cians in Ger­many under­line the reached or still nec­es­sary com­mon Euro­pean approach, sci­en­tists draw a more dif­fer­en­ti­at­ed pic­ture. Mar­tin Koop­mann, from the CDU-near the “Kon­rad-Ade­nauer-Foun­da­tion” agrees with the politi­cians that the com­mon cri­sis man­age­ment was effi­cient at last.[69] But first the gov­ern­ments under­went a ‘tri­al-and-error-process’ to find a com­mon posi­tion, which espe­cial­ly between the French and Ger­man gov­ern­ment, dis­agree­ments exist­ed. Jut­ta Frasch, guest researcher at the “Stiftung Wis­senschaft und Poli­tik”, attrib­ut­es these dis­agree­ments to the fact that the Ger­man gov­ern­ment was caught by sur­prise and was not able to define its own strat­e­gy at first.[70] This peri­od of inef­fi­cient talk and action end­ed, accord­ing to Koop­mann, with a peri­od in which the posi­tions of the Euro­pean nation­al gov­ern­ments con­verged. The nucle­us of this process sees Koopmann[71] in the meet­ing of the four Euro­pean G8 mem­ber states on 4 Octo­ber 2008.[72] The fol­low­ing steps of this coor­di­na­tion process were the meet­ing of the Eco­nom­ic and Finan­cial Affairs Coun­cil on 7 Octo­ber 2008,[73] the first meet­ing of the heads of state and gov­ern­ment of the Euro­zone mem­ber states on 12 Octo­ber 2008,[74] and final­ly the Euro­pean Coun­cil on 15 and 16 Octo­ber 2008 on which the mem­ber states agreed on num­ber of com­mon mea­sures to cope with the finan­cial crisis.[75] The role of the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion describes Koop­mann in these times as a mere sup­port­ing one. Regard­ing the fact that the gov­ern­ments of the Euro­zone mem­ber states played a cru­cial role in find­ing a com­mon posi­tion on mea­sures to solve the finan­cial cri­sis Frasch remarks that estab­lish­ing a eco­nom­ic gov­ern­ment of the Euro­zone, as pro­posed by French Pres­i­dent Sarkozy, might be coun­ter­pro­duc­tive. The infor­mal char­ac­ter of the Eurogroup, accord­ing to Frasch, made it espe­cial­ly flex­i­ble enough to react efficiently.[76]

The well-suit­ed reac­tion of the Euro­pean Cen­tral Bank (ECB) is regard­ed as an exam­ple of effi­cient cri­sis management.[77] Accord­ing to Wern­er Beck­er, researcher at “Deutsche Bank Research”, the ECB ful­fils three cru­cial func­tions dur­ing the cri­sis: It pro­vides as a “lender of last liquidity”[78] not just the mar­kets of the Euro­zone with liq­uid­i­ty since the cri­sis emerged. Its mon­e­tary pol­i­cy is inter­na­tion­al­ly coor­di­nat­ed with the Fed­er­al Reserve in the Unit­ed States. Final­ly, the ECB acts as a medi­a­tor between the nation­al governments.[79] Politi­cians share the view that the com­mon cur­ren­cy is a fac­tor of sta­bil­i­ty dur­ing the eco­nom­ic and finan­cial cri­sis as well.[80]

As a first cri­tique Koop­mann argues, sup­port­ed by Herib­ert Dieter from the “Stiftung Wis­senschaft und Politik”,[81] that the cri­sis did not reach the Euro­pean Union unex­pect­ed­ly, but Europe did not pre­pare itself while the cri­sis crossed the Atlantic. Hans-Wern­er Sinn, econ­o­mist at the “ifo Insti­tute”, dis­agrees with this argu­ment by say­ing that nei­ther inten­si­ty nor the sched­ule of the cur­rent cri­sis could have been predicted.[82] Euro­pean gov­ern­ments had hoped that the finan­cial cri­sis would remain in Amer­i­ca; how­ev­er, when the “Lehman Broth­ers” filed for bank­rupt­cy, the seri­ous­ness of the finan­cial cri­sis and its broad­en­ing effects could no longer be ignored.[83]

The sec­ond, and even more severe cri­tique Koop­mann express­es is the Euro­pean Union’s insuf­fi­cient equip­ment with insti­tu­tion­al fea­tures to allow an imme­di­ate response to sud­den crises.[84] The cri­sis put the lengthy debat­ed ques­tion, whether an inte­grat­ed mar­ket and com­mon mon­e­tary pol­i­cy can be effi­cient with­out a com­mon fis­cal pol­i­cy, back on the agen­da. Koop­man con­cludes that, due to this insti­tu­tion­al ‘fea­ture’ of the EU the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion can hard­ly be blamed for its inac­tiv­i­ty dur­ing the crisis.[85] Fur­ther­more, Daniela Schwarz­er, researcher at the “Stiftung Wis­senschaft und Poli­tik”, points out that the struc­ture and size of the EU bud­get restrict the EU’s abil­i­ty to stim­u­late the econ­o­my on its own.[86] Frasch agrees that the loose coor­di­na­tion of the eco­nom­ic and fis­cal poli­cies of the mem­ber states under the frame­work of the ‘open method of coor­di­na­tion’ is caus­ing prob­lems, but points out that the “Euro­pean Eco­nom­ic Recov­ery Plan”[87] might be a sign for a revi­sion on posi­tions held by the nation­al governments.[88] Schwarz­er reminds here that a pre­con­di­tion is still a con­sen­sus between the mem­ber states’ gov­ern­ments on the fis­cal pol­i­cy measures.[89]

Wern­er Abelshauser, pro­fes­sor for eco­nom­ic his­to­ry, is more crit­i­cal and crit­i­cis­es the per­for­mance of the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion as being not good. The mem­ber states remain the dom­i­nant actors, what is, accord­ing to him, not a dis­ad­van­tage. He recog­nis­es the val­ue of the Euro­pean Union, espe­cial­ly in the cur­rent cri­sis, as an instru­ment that increas­es the nation states’ abil­i­ty to act.[90] Going even fur­ther Joscha Schmier­er, for­mer advis­er of Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for For­eign Affairs Stein­meier and for­mer Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for For­eign Affairs Josch­ka Fis­ch­er, explic­it­ly agrees in his col­umn for the “Hein­rich Böll Foun­da­tion. The Green Polit­i­cal Foun­da­tion” in a some­how unusu­al coali­tion with Sinn’s fol­low­ing point of view:[91] Sinn points out that accord­ing to their nation­al eco­nom­ic struc­tures each mem­ber state has dif­fer­ent inter­ests con­cern­ing the ques­tion how the cri­sis should be solved.[92] Thus a com­mon Euro­pean approach to cope with the cri­sis is unlike­ly, as each gov­ern­ment had to jus­ti­fy these mea­sures before its nation­al electorate.[93] Sinn asks: Would the Brits pay for a bank­rupt Ger­man indus­try? He doesn’t think so.[94]

Eval­u­at­ing the Euro­pean cri­sis man­age­ment is just one side of the debate. Most par­tic­i­pants already think about lessons that should be drawn from the cur­rent cri­sis. Fed­er­al Min­is­ter of Finance, Stein­brück, envi­sions the fund­ing of a Euro­pean finan­cial author­i­ty in a long, but not in a short-term per­spec­tive, as a mea­sure to pre­vent future finan­cial crises.[95] His sec­re­tary of state, Jörg Asmussen, point­ed out in an arti­cle, on which role the Euro­pean Union should play in short-term measures.[96] Accord­ing to him, the best way to reduce the prob­a­bil­i­ty of future finan­cial crises is to imple­ment the roadmap the Coun­cil for Eco­nom­ic and Finan­cial Affairs agreed on in Octo­ber 2007.[97] But this had to be com­ple­ment­ed by the imple­men­ta­tion of the rec­om­men­da­tions the “Finan­cial Sta­bil­i­ty Forum” made in April 2008.[98] Dieter is much more pes­simistic in his analy­sis: “A com­mon Euro­pean pro­pos­al for reform­ing inter­na­tion­al finan­cial pol­i­cy is increas­ing­ly unlike­ly […].”[99] Espe­cial­ly the British inter­est in the ‘city of London’s’ com­pet­i­tive­ness on the glob­al finan­cial mar­ket is, accord­ing to him, a major obsta­cle for a com­mon Euro­pean position.[100] But with­out a com­mon posi­tion and a sig­nif­i­cant con­tri­bu­tion to the stim­u­la­tion of the econ­o­my, Europe will not play a sig­nif­i­cant role in restruc­tur­ing the glob­al finan­cial market.[101]

“The world is clearly searching for a new order”[102]

“[N]ew play­ers and Pow­ers that still have to find their places in the inter­na­tion­al order are seek­ing to enter the glob­al stage.”[103] Accord­ing to Stein­meier, Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for For­eign Affairs, the finan­cial cri­sis is one fac­tor among sev­er­al con­tribut­ing to this devel­op­ment. He is “cer­tain that the painful tremors on the world finan­cial mar­kets will accel­er­ate the mul­ti­po­lar­iza­tion of the inter­na­tion­al finan­cial system.”[104] His fel­low par­ty mem­ber and Fed­er­al Min­is­ter of Finance, Stein­brück, does not “expect any imme­di­ate, vis­i­ble shifts”[105], but agrees with Stein­meier on the direc­tion of the shift. Accord­ing to him, with­in a decade, the impor­tance of ‘wall street’ and the ‘city of Lon­don’ will not dimin­ish but more finan­cial cen­tres will gain influ­ence. He names Chi­na, Rus­sia, the Unit­ed Arab Emi­rates and Europe. This influ­ence he does not just see in terms of eco­nom­ic pow­er but also in polit­i­cal influ­ence on reg­u­la­to­ry frame­works and on the pre­vail­ing mar­ket philosophy.[106] As a short-term result, Asmussen, sec­re­tary of state in the Ger­man Fed­er­al Min­istry of Finance, expects that the finan­cial sector’s share of world econ­o­my will decrease.[107]

The envi­sioned reform of the group of eight (G8) to a group of 20 (G20) is cen­tral­ly dis­cussed as a reac­tion to shifts in the inter­na­tion­al eco­nom­ic pow­er con­stel­la­tion. Stein­brück regards it as an antic­i­pa­tion of future eco­nom­ic real­i­ties. While he does not believe that shifts in the eco­nom­ic pow­er struc­ture will go as far as a loss of the Unit­ed States’ lead­ing role.[108] But after the G20 Sum­mit on 15 Novem­ber 2008 in Wash­ing­ton, he doubts that it will ever be pos­si­ble to return to a G7 format.[109] In the lead­er­ship ques­tion, the Ger­man Fed­er­al Min­is­ter for For­eign Affairs, Stein­meier, is more scep­ti­cal: “no sin­gle play­er will be able to lay down those rules [reg­u­lat­ing the finan­cial mar­kets]. It will no longer be pos­si­ble for any one coun­try to act as if it were immune to unde­sir­able developments.”[110] Sci­en­tists see as well the for­ma­tion of the G20 as an indi­ca­tor for the reval­u­a­tion of the polit­i­cal role of the ‘emerg­ing mar­kets’ as a long-last­ing result of the cur­rent crisis.[111]

The eval­u­a­tion of the G20’s future role is ambiva­lent: Abelshauser regards the open lead­er­ship ques­tion in the G20 as a prob­lem. Accord­ing to him in the G20 for­mat, it is still unclear who will decide what.[112] And he reminds that the goal of reg­u­lat­ing the finan­cial mar­ket has already been put on the agen­da of the then G7 by the for­mer Ger­man Chan­cel­lor Hel­mut Schmidt in 1980 and remained there unre­solved since then. In a com­par­a­tive per­spec­tive Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert and Stormy Mild­ner con­clude as well, that the increased num­ber of actors make com­pro­mis­es on finan­cial mar­ket reg­u­la­tions more difficult.[113] Instead, Stein­meier regards this increased num­ber as a chance for the Euro­pean Union. “Europe, with its tried-and-test­ed pol­i­cy of medi­a­tion and rec­on­cil­i­a­tion of inter­ests, could play a key role in this.”[114]

 

 

[1] Ger­man Fed­er­al For­eign Office: The EU Reform Treaty, avail­able at: http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Europa/LissabonVertrag/Reformvertrag.html (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[2] For more details see Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: Brus­sels Euro­pean Coun­cil. 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008. Pres­i­den­cy Con­clu­sions, 12 Decem­ber 2008, 17271/08, avail­able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[3] Cf. the par­lia­men­tary debate on Steinmeier’s gov­ern­ment dec­la­ra­tion of 18 Decem­ber 2008, see Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, pp. 21128(A)-21151©, avail­able at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[4] See, for exam­ple, the state­ment by Oskar Lafontaine (DIE LINKE) in the par­lia­men­tary debate on Steinmeier’s gov­ern­ment dec­la­ra­tion of 18 Decem­ber 2008, see Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, 18 Decem­ber 2008, p. 21137(B)-©, avail­able at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[5] See, for exam­ple, Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, 18 Decem­ber 2008, p. 21151(B)-©, avail­able at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009). The cor­re­spond­ing doc­u­ments are: Beschlussempfehlung und Bericht des Auss­chuss­es für die Angele­gen­heit­en der Europäis­chen Union (21. Auss­chuss) zu dem Antrag der Abge­ord­neten Dr. Diether Dehm, Moni­ka Knoche, Hüseyin-Kenan Aydin, weit­er­er Abge­ord­neter und der Frak­tion DIE LINKE – Druck­sache 16/8879 – Das Rat­i­fizierungsver­fahren zum Ver­trag von Liss­abon aus­set­zen – Ein Sozial­pro­tokoll vere­in­baren, Druck­sache 16/10832, 11 Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/108/1610832.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009) and Entschließungsantrag der Frak­tion DIE LINKE. Zu der Abgabe ein­er Regierungserk­lärung durch den Bun­desmin­is­ter des Auswär­ti­gen zu den Ergeb­nis­sen des Europäis­chen Rats am 11./12. Dezem­ber 2008, Druck­sache 16/11404, 16 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/114/1611404.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[6] See Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/157, 24 April 2008, pp. 16482(D)-16485©, avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16157.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[7] Insti­tut für Europäis­che Poli­tik (Ed.): EU-27 Watch, No. 7, Sep­tem­ber 2008, Berlin, p. 16, avail­able at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/EU_Watch/EU-27_Watch_No_7.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009). See also Press­ing on with rat­i­fi­ca­tion: The Ger­man reac­tion to the Irish ‘No’, in: Insti­tut für Europäis­che Poli­tik (Ed.): EU-27 Watch, No. 7, Sep­tem­ber 2008, Berlin, pp. 36–38, avail­able at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/EU_Watch/EU-27_Watch_No_7.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[8] S. Höll/R. Boden­stein­er: Köh­ler bil­ligt EU-Ver­trag, in: sueddeutsche.de, 8 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/401/313308/text/ (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009); Ref­er­ence and Research Ser­vices of the Deutsch­er Bun­destag: Laws relat­ing to the Treaty of Lis­bon: cer­ti­fi­ca­tion, pro­mul­ga­tion, entry into force, Top­i­cal Term of 30 Octo­ber 2008, Research Paper 66/08, avail­able at: http://www.bundestag.de/wissen/analysen/2008/gesetze_zum_vertrag_von_lissabon.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009). For the laws pub­lished in the Fed­er­al Law Gazette see: Gesetz zum Ver­trag von Liss­abon vom 13. Dezem­ber 2007, vom 8. Okto­ber 2008, in: Bun­des­ge­set­zblatt, Jahrgang 2008, Teil II Nr. 27, 14 Octo­ber 2008, p. 1038, avail­able at: http://frei.bundesgesetzblatt.de/pdf/bgbl2/bgbl208s1038.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009) and Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundge­set­zes (Artikel 23, 45 und 93), vom 8. Okto­ber 2008, in: Bun­des­ge­set­zblatt, Jahrgang 2008, Teil 1 Nr. 45, 16 Octo­ber 2008, p. 1926, avail­able at: http://www.bgblportal.de/BGBL/bgbl1f/bgbl108s1926.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[9] Among oth­ers, a con­ser­v­a­tive MP from the CSU, Peter Gauweil­er, and the par­lia­men­tary fac­tion of the Left Par­ty have appealed to the con­sti­tu­tion­al court. For the appeals and a first cov­er­age of the hear­ing see, for exam­ple, Rein­hard Müller: Bewährung­sprobe für Europas Inte­gra­tion. Das Ver­fas­sungs­gericht ver­han­delt über den Liss­abon-Ver­trag, in: Frank­furter All­ge­meine Zeitung, 10 Feb­ru­ary 2009; Herib­ert Prantl: Deutsch-europäis­ch­er Show­down, in: Süd­deutsche Zeitung, 10 Feb­ru­ary 2009; Hel­mut Ker­sch­er: Macht, die andere ohn­mächtig macht, in: Süd­deutsche Zeitung, 10 Feb­ru­ary 2009; Herib­ert Prantl: Ver­fas­sungs­gericht zweifelt an der EU-Reform, in: Süd­deutsche Zeitung, 11 Feb­ru­ary 2009; Hel­mut Ker­sch­er: Europas Refor­mver­trag wird in Karl­sruhe zer­legt, in: Süd­deutsche Zeitung, 11 Feb­ru­ary 2009. For a first assess­ment of the appeals see, for exam­ple: Elmar Brok/Martin Sel­mayr: Der ‚Ver­trag der Par­la­mente’ als Gefahr für die Demokratie? Zu den offen­sichtlich unbe­grün­de­ten Ver­fas­sungskla­gen gegen den Ver­trag von Liss­abon, in: inte­gra­tion 3/08, pp. 217–234, avail­able at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/index.php?id=655 (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[10] Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: Brus­sels Euro­pean Coun­cil. 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008. Pres­i­den­cy Con­clu­sions, 12 Decem­ber 2008, 17271/08, avail­able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/104692.pdf(last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[11] Ref­er­ence and Research Ser­vices of the Deutsch­er Bun­destag: Verän­derun­gen in der Europäis­chen Union im Jahr 2009, Europa-The­ma of 12 Jan­u­ary 2009, Research Paper 02/09, avail­able at: http://www.bundestag.de/wissen/analysen/2009/veraenderungen_in_der_eu_2009.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[12] For an overview over the par­ties’ prepa­ra­tions for the Euro­pean elec­tions in Ger­many and fur­ther links see, for exam­ple, the fol­low­ing web­sites: http://www.wahlen-europa.de/, http://www.cap-lmu.de/themen/europawahl/index.php, or http://www.cep.eu/europawahl2009.html (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[13] Gerd Langguth: Warum See­hofer plöt­zlich Gefall­en an Volksab­stim­mungen find­et, in: spiegel online, 18 Jan­u­ary 2009, avail­able at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,600617,00.html (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009); Albert Schäf­fer: Banger Blick auf die Europawahl, in: FAZ.net, 12 Jan­u­ary 2009, avail­able at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub594835B672714A1DB1A121534F010EE1/Doc~E209176357EEE4E22BC1709FC7BFCACC0~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[14] Cf. the par­lia­men­tary debate on Steinmeier’s gov­ern­ment dec­la­ra­tion of 18 Decem­ber 2008, see Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, pp. 21128(A)-21151©, here p. 21131©, avail­able at: http://www.bundestag.de/bic/plenarprotokolle/pp_pdf/16196.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009). See also spiegel online: EU-Gipfel senkt Ziele für Kon­junk­tur­paket, 12 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/ausland/0,1518,595977,00.html (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009); Niko­las Busse: EU strebt zweites Ref­er­en­dum in Irland an, in FAZ.net, 11 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub99C3EECA60D84C08AD6B3E60C4EA807F/Doc~E78978D5E2C64410DA14E9774BC6E178F~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[15] BDA – Bun­desvere­ini­gung der Deutschen Arbeit­ge­berver­bände: euro-info No. 7, 16 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.arbeitgeber.de/www/arbeitgeber.nsf/res/Euro-Info7_08.pdf/$file/Euro-Info7_08.pdf (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009); BDI/BDA The Ger­man Busi­ness Rep­re­sen­ta­tion: BDI/BDA Brüs­sel Aktuell, No. 11, 19 Decem­ber 2008, avail­abe at: http://www.bdi-online.de/BDIONLINE_INEAASP/iFILE.dll/XC918DA0597D549CDAD350C17D5EF90D3/2F252102116711D5A9C0009027D62C80/PDF/Br%FCssel_Aktuell_11_2008.PDF (last access 3 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[16] See also chap­ter IV “The jubilee and memo­r­i­al year 2009 and the shad­ows of elec­tions” in this issue.
[17] Finan­cial Times Deutsch­land: Oba­ma und McCain liegen gle­ich auf, 25. August 2008, avail­able at: http://www.ftd.de/politik/international/:US_Umfrage_Obama_und_McCain_liegen_gleichauf/405201.html (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[18] Angela Merkel, Pressemit­teilung, Bun­deskan­z­lerin online, 07. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.bundeskanzlerin.de/Content/DE/pressemitteilungen/BP (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[19] Angela Merkel as quot­ed in Frank­furter All­ge­meine Zeitung: Oba­ma ruft eine Ära des Dienens aus, 20. Jan­u­ary 2009.
[20] Eckart von Klead­en: Mit Europas Ausre­den ist es bei Oba­ma vor­bei, CDU/CSU Bun­destags­frak­tion online, 08. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.von-klaeden.de/portal (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[21] Ruprecht Polenz: Er wird auf die Ver­bün­de­ten zuge­hen, Inter­view, Deutsch­landra­dio, 05. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.dradio.de/dkultur/semdungen/interview.de (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[22] Eckart von Klead­en, 08. Novem­ber 2008.
[23] RP online: Polenz: Oba­ma soll Nahost-Kon­flikt als erstes ange­hen, 28. Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.rp-online.de/public/article/politik/deutschland/654824/Polenz-Obama-soll-Nahost-Konflikt-als-erstes-angehen.html (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[24] Deutsch­landra­dio, 05. Novem­ber 2008.
[25] CDU/CSU – Bun­destags­frak­tion (2009): Posi­tion­spa­pi­er der CDU/CSU – Bun­destags­frak­tion. Beschluss vom 20. Jan­u­ary 2009, avail­able at: http://www.von-klaeden.de/ (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[26] CDU/CSU – Bun­destags­frak­tion (2009), p. 4.
[27] CDU/CSU – Bun­destags­frak­tion (2009), p. 5.
[28] Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier: Im Engen Schul­ter­schluss. Offen­er Brief von Außen­min­is­ter Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier an Barack Oba­ma, 12. Jan­u­ary 2009, in: Der Spiegel, Nr. 3/2009, Ham­burg: Spiegel-Ver­lag (Ger­man Ver­sion). The Eng­lish ver­sion is avail­able from the SPD web­site: http://www.frank-walter-steinmeier.de/aktuell/namensbeitraege/090112_obama-brief.html (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[29] DPA News agency: Ger­many to Oba­ma: We Will Resist Calls for More Troops, Deutsche Welle online, 09. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.dw-world.de/ (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[30] Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier, 12. Jan­u­ary 2009.
[31] Carsten Volk­ery: Der Überzeu­gungstäter der SPD, Spiegel online, 04. Feb­ru­ary 2008, avail­able at: www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[32] Karsten Voigt (2008): Die Wahlen in den USA und die Zukun­ft des deutsch-amerikanis­chen Ver­hält­niss­es, in: Zeitschrift für Außen- und Sicher­heit­spoli­tik, ZFAS (1), Wies­baden: VS Ver­lag für Sozial­wis­senschaften, pp. 6–15.
[33] Karsten Voigt (2008).
[34] Karsten Voigt (2008).
[35] The authors of the doc­u­ment are: Ex-chan­cel­lor Hel­mut Schmidt (SPD), Ex-Bun­de­spräsi­dent Richard von Weizsäck­er (CDU), for­eign affairs expert Egon Bahr (SPD), and Ex-For­eign Min­is­ter Hans-Diet­rich Gentsch­er (FDP). It was print­ed in the Frank­furter All­ge­meine Zeitung on 09. Jan­u­ary 2009.
[36] Gui­do West­er­welle: Abrüs­tung muss wieder zu einem Kernbe­standteil deutsch­er Außen­poli­tik wer­den, Por­tal Lib­er­al, 09. Jan­u­ary 2009, avail­able at: www.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[37] Wern­er Hoy­er: Barack Oba­ma wird 44. US-Pres­i­dent – Change has come to Amer­i­ca, Por­tal Lib­er­al, 07. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[38] Wern­er Hoy­er: Hoy­er begrüßt Wan­del in der US-Außen­poli­tik unter Oba­ma, Por­tal Lib­er­al, 26. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.fdp.de/webcom/show_article.php (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[39] Clau­dia Roth and Rein­hard Bütikofer: Eine his­torische Wahl, Bünd­nis 90/ Die Grü­nen, Presse-Info, 05. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.grüne.de (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[40] Rain­der Steen­block: Oba­ma braucht die Europäer, das weiß er, Inter­view, Deutsche Welle, 06. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.dw-world.de (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[41] Hel­mut Scholz: Real­is­mus ist ange­bracht, Die Linke online, 05. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.die-linke.de/politik/international/detail/artikel (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[42] Wulf Schmiese: Stre­it in Berlin, in: Frank­furter All­ge­meine Zeitung, 22. Jan­u­ary 2009, p. 2.
[43] Frank­furter Rund­schau: Deutsch­land will enge Part­ner­schaft mit Oba­ma, Frank­furter Rund­schau online, 05. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.fr-online.de/in_und_ausland/politik/dosseirs/spezial_us_wahl (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[44] Deutsche Welle: Ger­many has doubts about Obama’s Green Com­mit­ment, Deutsche Welle online, 06. Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: www.dw-world.de (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[45] Ste­fan Fröh­lich (2009): Außen­poli­tik unter Oba­ma – prag­ma­tis­ch­er Mul­ti­lat­er­al­is­mus und transat­lantis­che Annäherun­gen, in: inter­gra­tion 1/2009, Berlin: Insti­tut für Europäis­che Poli­tik, pp. 3–16.
[46] Ste­fan Fröh­lich (2009), p. 7.
[47] Ste­fan Fröh­lich (2009), p. 15 ff.
[48] Peter Rudolf (2008): Amerikas neuer glob­aler Führungsanspruch. Außen­poli­tik unter Oba­ma, SWP-Aktuell 77, Novem­ber 2008, Berlin: SWP.
[49] Finan­cial Times: Poll shows EU resis­tance on Afghan war, FT.com online, 19. Jan­u­ary 2009, avail­able at: www.ft.com/cms.com (last access: 30 Jan­u­ary 2009).
[50] Christlich Demokratis­che Union Deutsch­lands (CDU).
[51] Angela Merkel in the par­lia­men­tary debate on the Euro­pean Coun­cil on 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008, in: Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/193, pp. 20683 ©-20687 ©, here p. 20684 (A), avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16193.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[52] Ibid., p. 20684 (B).
[53] Euro­pean Com­mis­sion: Com­mu­ni­ca­tion from the Com­mis­sion to the Euro­pean Coun­cil. A Euro­pean Eco­nom­ic Recov­ery Plan, COM (2008) 800, avail­able at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0800:FIN:EN:PDF (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[54] Angela Merkel in the par­lia­men­tary debate on Euro­pean Coun­cil on 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008, in: Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/193, pp. 20683 ©-20687 ©, here p. 20684 (B), avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16193.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[55] Sozialdemokratis­che Partei Deutsch­lands (SPD).
[56] Ste­fan Theil: Germany’s Frau Nein. The world’s pol­i­cy­mak­ers say big spend­ing pack­ages will spur growth. But the leader of Europe’s biggest econ­o­my says she’s done enough already, in: Newsweek, 15 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172619 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[57] Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier in the par­lia­men­tary debate on the Euro­pean Coun­cil on 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008, in: Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, pp. 21128 (B)-21132 (A), here p. 21129 (D), avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[58] Carsten Volk­ery: EU-Wirtschaftspakt: Kan­zlerkan­di­dat treibt Kan­z­lerin, Spiegel Online, 13 Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/0,1518,590293,00.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[59] „Europäis­ch­er Zukun­ftspakt für Arbeit“, avail­able at: http://www.spd.de/de/pdf/material/131108_EU_Zukunftspakt.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[60] Ibid.
[61] Peer Stein­brück, Fed­er­al Min­is­ter of Finance, in an inter­view with Rein­hold Beck­mann, in: ARD: beck­mann, 27 Octo­ber 2008, minute 41:25–42:40, avail­able at: http://www.daserste.de/beckmann/sendung_dyn~uid,exe47b6c7gbesrqhz7jx7z77~cm.asp (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[62] Ste­fan Thiel: ‘It Doesn’t Exist!’. Germany’s out­spo­ken finance min­is­ter on the hope­less search for ‘the Great Res­cue Plan.’, Newsweek, 15 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172613 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[63] Freie Demokratis­che Partei (FDP).
[64] Wern­er Hoy­er in the par­lia­men­tary debate on the Euro­pean Coun­cil on 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008, in: Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, pp. 21132 (B)-21133 (D), here p. 21132 (C‑D), avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[65] Die Linke.
[66] Oskar Lafontaine in the par­lia­men­tary debate on the Euro­pean Coun­cil on 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008, in: Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, pp. 21135 ©-21137 ©, here p. 21135 ©-21136 (A), avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[67] Bünd­nis 90/Die Grünen.
[68] Renate Künast in the par­lia­men­tary debate on the Euro­pean Coun­cil on 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008, in: Bun­destagsple­narpro­tokoll 16/196, pp. 21139 (B)-21141 (A), here pp. 21140 ©-21141 (A), avail­able at: http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btp/16/16196.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[69] Mar­tin Koop­mann: Die Europäis­che Union in der Finanz­mark­tkrise. Gelun­ge­nes Krisen­man­age­ment – strate­gis­che Defizite, in: Kon­rad-Ade­nauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analy­sen und Argu­mente No. 56, 3 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544–1‑30.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[70] Jut­ta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weck­ruf für die EU, in: Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner (eds.): Glob­ale Ord­nungspoli­tik am Schei­deweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz­mark­tkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21–26, here p. 21, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[71] Mar­tin Koop­mann: Die Europäis­che Union in der Finanz­mark­tkrise. Gelun­ge­nes Krisen­man­age­ment – strate­gis­che Defizite, in: Kon­rad-Ade­nauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analy­sen und Argu­mente No. 56, 3 Decem­ber 2008, p. 4, avail­able at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544–1‑30.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[72] See French Coun­cil Pres­i­den­cy: Sum­mit on the inter­na­tion­al finan­cial cri­sis, 4 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-04.10.2008/sommet_crise_financiere_internationale (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[73] See Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: 2894th Coun­cil meet­ing Eco­nom­ic and Finan­cial Affairs, press release, Doc. 13784/08 (Presse 279), 7 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/103250.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[74] See French Coun­cil Pres­i­den­cy: Sum­mit of the euro area coun­tries: dec­la­ra­tion on a con­cert­ed Euro­pean action plan of the euro area coun­tries, 12 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-12.10.2008/sommet_pays_zone_euro_declaration_plan_action_concertee (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009); Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: Sum­mit of the Euro Area coun­tries – Dec­la­ra­tion on a con­cert­ed Euro­pean Action Plan of the Euro Area coun­tries, Doc. 14239/08, 14 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st14/st14239.en08.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[75] Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: Brus­sels Euro­pean Coun­cil 15 and 16 Octo­ber 2008. Pres­i­den­cy Con­clu­sions, Doc. 14368/08, 16 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/en/ec/103441.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[76] Jut­ta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weck­ruf für die EU, in: Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner (eds.): Glob­ale Ord­nungspoli­tik am Schei­deweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz­mark­tkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21–26, here p. 21, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009). See as well: Daniela Schwarz­er: Zehn Jahre Gov­er­nance der Euro­zone: ökonomis­che Bilanz und insti­tu­tionelle Dynamiken jen­seits der Ver­tragsre­vi­sio­nen, in: inte­gra­tion 1/2009, pp. 17–32, here pp. 27–28, avail­able at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/integration_2009/volltext/schwarzer1-09.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[77] Mar­tin Koop­mann: Die Europäis­che Union in der Finanz­mark­tkrise. Gelun­ge­nes Krisen­man­age­ment – strate­gis­che Defizite, in: Kon­rad-Ade­nauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analy­sen und Argu­mente No. 56, 3 Decem­ber 2008, p. 3, avail­able at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544–1‑30.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[78] Wern­er Beck­er: Die Währung­sunion im Reifetest der Finanzkrise, Deutsche Bank Research (ed.): Aktueller Kom­men­tar, 29 Octo­ber 2008, p. 1, avail­able at: http://www.dbresearch.de/PROD/DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD/PROD0000000000233153.pdf (last access 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[79] Ibid. p. 1–2.
[80] Nor­bert Röttgen: Europa in der Finanzkrise dank des Euro gut gerüstet, press release, 15 Feb­ru­ary 2008, avail­able at: http://www.cducsu.de/Titel__Thema_des_Tages_Europa_in_der_Finanzkrise_dank_des_Euros_gut_geruestet/TabID__1/SubTabID__5/InhaltTypID__4/InhaltID__8904/Inhalte.aspx (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[81] Herib­ert Dieter: Man­ag­ing the Finan­cial Cri­sis – Is Europe Get­ting It Right?, SWP Com­ment 6/2009, pp. 1–2, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5774 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[82] Hans-Wern­er Sinn in an inter­view, in: FAZ.NET: “Wir soll­ten uns nicht ver­rückt machen lassen”, 12 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub58241E4DF1B149538ABC24D0E82A6266/Doc~E494F421C10D94F9C9E45520367479B7E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[83] Jut­ta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weck­ruf für die EU, in: Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner (eds.): Glob­ale Ord­nungspoli­tik am Schei­deweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz­mark­tkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21–26, here p. 21, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[84] Mar­tin Koop­mann: Die Europäis­che Union in der Finanz­mark­tkrise. Gelun­ge­nes Krisen­man­age­ment – strate­gis­che Defizite, in: Kon­rad-Ade­nauer-Stiftung e.V. (ed.): Analy­sen und Argu­mente No. 56, 3 Decem­ber 2008, p. 3, avail­able at: http://www.kas.de/wf/doc/kas_15245-544–1‑30.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[85] Ibid., p. 4; Nico­laus Heinen: Wirtschaft­spoli­tis­che Koor­dinierung in der EU hat ihre Belas­tung­sprobe bestanden, Deutsche Bank Research (ed.): Aktueller Kom­men­tar, 17 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.dbresearch.de/servlet/reweb2.ReWEB?addmenu=false&document=PROD0000000000233065&rdLeftMargin=10&rdShowArchivedDocus=true&rwdspl=0&rwnode=DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD$WIPO&rwobj=ReDisplay.Start.class&rwsite=DBR_INTERNET_DE-PROD (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[86] Daniela Schwarz­er: Zehn Jahre Gov­er­nance der Euro­zone: ökonomis­che Bilanz und insti­tu­tionelle Dynamiken jen­seits der Ver­tragsre­vi­sio­nen, in: inte­gra­tion 1/2009, pp. 17–32, here pp. 29, avail­able at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/integration_2009/volltext/schwarzer1-09.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[87] Euro­pean Com­mis­sion: Com­mu­ni­ca­tion from the Com­mis­sion to the Euro­pean Coun­cil. A Euro­pean Eco­nom­ic Recov­ery Plan, COM (2008) 800, avail­able at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2008:0800:FIN:EN:PDF (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009); Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: Brus­sels Euro­pean Coun­cil 11 and 12 Decem­ber 2008. Pres­i­den­cy Con­clu­sions, Doc. 17271/1/08, 13 Feb­ru­ary 2009, avail­able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/104692.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[88] Jut­ta Frasch: Die Finanzkrise: Ein Weck­ruf für die EU, in: Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner (eds.): Glob­ale Ord­nungspoli­tik am Schei­deweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz­mark­tkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 21–26, here p. 22, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[89] Daniela Schwarz­er: Zehn Jahre Gov­er­nance der Euro­zone: ökonomis­che Bilanz und insti­tu­tionelle Dynamiken jen­seits der Ver­tragsre­vi­sio­nen, in: inte­gra­tion 1/2009, pp. 17–32, here pp. 29, avail­able at: http://www.iep-berlin.de/fileadmin/website/09_Publikationen/integration_2009/volltext/schwarzer1-09.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[90] Wern­er Abelshauser: Geschichte wieder­holt sich nicht. Oder doch? Szenar­ien der Finanz­mark­tkrise, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawis­senschaft 4/2008, pp. 565–576, here p. 575.
[91] Joscha Schmier­er: Die glob­ale Finanzkrise prüft die Gemein­schaft. EU in der Bewährung­sprobe, Zwis­chen­ruf zur Aussen­poli­tik, with­out date, avail­able at: http://www.boell.de/internationalepolitik/aussensicherheit/wirtschaft-5206.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[92] Hans-Wern­er Sinn in an inter­view, in: FAZ.NET: “Wir soll­ten uns nicht ver­rückt machen lassen”, 12 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub58241E4DF1B149538ABC24D0E82A6266/Doc~E494F421C10D94F9C9E45520367479B7E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[93] Joscha Schmier­er: Die glob­ale Finanzkrise prüft die Gemein­schaft. EU in der Bewährung­sprobe, Zwis­chen­ruf zur Aussen­poli­tik, with­out date, avail­able at: http://www.boell.de/internationalepolitik/aussensicherheit/wirtschaft-5206.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[94] Hans-Wern­er Sinn in an inter­view, in: FAZ.NET: “Wir soll­ten uns nicht ver­rückt machen lassen”, 12 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.faz.net/s/Rub58241E4DF1B149538ABC24D0E82A6266/Doc~E494F421C10D94F9C9E45520367479B7E~ATpl~Ecommon~Scontent.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[95] Peer Stein­brück, Fed­er­al Min­is­ter of Finance, in an inter­view with Rein­hold Beck­mann, in: ARD: beck­mann, 27 Octo­ber 2008, minute 18:20–18:50, avail­able at: http://www.daserste.de/beckmann/sendung_dyn~uid,exe47b6c7gbesrqhz7jx7z77~cm.asp (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[96] Jörg Ass­mussen: Poli­tis­che Antworten auf die Finanz­mark­tkrise, in: Neue Gesellschaft – Frank­furter Hefte 11/2008, pp. 12–15, here p. 15.
[97] Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: 2822nd Coun­cil meet­ing Eco­nom­ic and Finan­cial Affairs, press release, Doc. 13571/07 (Presse 217), 9 Octo­ber 2008, pp. 22–29, avail­able at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ecofin/96375.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009); for an updat­ed ver­sion see: Coun­cil of the Euro­pean Union: Finan­cial Mar­kets Sta­bil­i­ty Roadmaps, Doc. 9056/1/08, 15 May 2008, avail­able at: http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/08/st09/st09056-re01.en08.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[98] Finan­cial Sta­bil­i­ty Forum: Report of the Finan­cial Sta­bil­i­ty Forum on Enhanc­ing Mar­ket and Insti­tu­tion­al Resilience, 7 April 2008, avail­able at: http://www.fsforum.org/publications/r_0804.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009); for the progress in the imple­men­ta­tion see Finan­cial Sta­bil­i­ty Forum: Report of the Finan­cial Sta­bil­i­ty Forum on Enhanc­ing Mar­ket and Insti­tu­tion­al Resilience. Fol­low-up on Imple­men­ta­tion, 10 Octo­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.fsforum.org/press/pr_081009f.pdf (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[99] Herib­ert Dieter: Man­ag­ing the Finan­cial Cri­sis – Is Europe Get­ting It Right?, SWP Com­ment 6/2009, pp. 1–2, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/en/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5774 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[100] Ibid., p. 2.
[101] Ibid.
[102] Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier in his speech at the UN Gen­er­al Assem­bly, in: UN Gen­er­al Assem­bly: offi­cial records, 63rd ses­sion, 12th ple­nary meet­ing, 26 Sep­tem­ber 2008, Doc. A/63/PV.12, p. 47, avail­able at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/65/PDF/N0852265.pdf?OpenElement (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2008).
[103] Ibid.
[104] Ibid., p. 48.
[105] Ste­fan Thiel: ‘It Doesn’t Exist!’. Germany’s out­spo­ken finance min­is­ter on the hope­less search for ‘the Great Res­cue Plan.’, Newsweek, 15 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172613 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[106] Peer Stein­brück: “Wie viel Ver­trauen ver­di­enen die Finanzmärk­te?”, press release, 13 Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/DE/Presse/Reden_20und_20Interviews/102__RedeGDV__13112008.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[107] Jörg Ass­mussen, sec­re­tary of state in the Ger­man Fed­er­al Min­istry of Finance, in the dis­cus­sion “Ansätze zur Finanz­mark­treg­ulierung” organ­ised by the “Man­agerkreis der Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung” on 4 Decem­ber 2008 in Berlin.
[108] Peer Stein­brück: “Wie viel Ver­trauen ver­di­enen die Finanzmärk­te?”, press release, 13 Novem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/DE/Presse/Reden_20und_20Interviews/102__RedeGDV__13112008.html (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[109] Ste­fan Thiel: ‘It Doesn’t Exist!’. Germany’s out­spo­ken finance min­is­ter on the hope­less search for ‘the Great Res­cue Plan.’, Newsweek, 15 Decem­ber 2008, avail­able at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/172613 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[110] Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier in his speech at the UN Gen­er­al Assem­bly, in: UN Gen­er­al Assem­bly: offi­cial records, 63rd ses­sion, 12th ple­nary meet­ing, 26 Sep­tem­ber 2008, Doc. A/63/PV.12, p. 48, avail­able at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/65/PDF/N0852265.pdf?OpenElement (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2008).
[111] Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner: Ein­leitung, in: Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner (eds.): Glob­ale Ord­nungspoli­tik am Schei­deweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz­mark­tkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 7–12, here p. 12, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[112] Wern­er Abelshauser: Geschichte wieder­holt sich nicht. Oder doch? Szenar­ien der Finanz­mark­tkrise, in: Zeitschrift für Staats- und Europawis­senschaft 4/2008, pp. 565–576, here p. 570.
[113] Prob­lem­stel­lung und Schlussfol­gerun­gen, in: Hanns Gün­ther Hilpert/Stormy Mild­ner (eds.): Glob­ale Ord­nungspoli­tik am Schei­deweg. Eine Analyse der aktuellen Finanz­mark­tkrise, SWP-Studie 4/2009, pp. 5–6, here p. 6, avail­able at: http://www.swp-berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5758 (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2009).
[114] Frank-Wal­ter Stein­meier in his speech at the UN Gen­er­al Assem­bly, in: UN Gen­er­al Assem­bly: offi­cial records, 63rd ses­sion, 12th ple­nary meet­ing, 26 Sep­tem­ber 2008, Doc. A/63/PV.12, p. 48, avail­able at: http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N08/522/65/PDF/N0852265.pdf?OpenElement (last access: 25 Feb­ru­ary 2008).