1. Euroscepticism and European Parliament elections

Economic crisis brought political crisis

In the Repub­lic of Cyprus, the cam­paign for the 2014 elec­tions for the Euro­pean Par­lia­ment took place in a tense, high­ly volatile and total­ly unpre­dictable polit­i­cal envi­ron­ment. Cypri­ots shared with oth­er “South­ern” EU mem­ber-states the high unem­ploy­ment, espe­cial­ly youth unem­ploy­ment, painful eco­nom­ic reces­sion, per­son­al pes­simism and social dis­ori­en­ta­tion. Oth­er caus­es, how­ev­er, were sui gener­is to Cyprus: the ongo­ing debate on the actu­al domes­tic and exter­nal sources of the finan­cial and broad­er eco­nom­ic cri­sis that led to the Troika’s hege­mo­ny; anx­i­eties gen­er­at­ed by the new bi-com­mu­nal nego­ti­a­tions to resolve the Cyprus prob­lem; and deep inse­cu­ri­ties due to the feared “pack­age deal” impos­ing a pseu­do-res­o­lu­tion of the country’s prob­lem and a pos­si­ble usurpa­tion of the promis­ing hydro­car­bon deposits in Cyprus’s exclu­sive eco­nom­ic zone.

Togeth­er with the sus­tained dis­ap­point­ment at the lack of EU sol­i­dar­i­ty after the dev­as­tat­ing Eurogroup deci­sions of March 2013, these were the key top­ics in the 2014 elec­toral cam­paign in Cyprus. They were pur­sued by the polit­i­cal par­ties on a mixed “Cyprus and EU” agen­da, while the vot­ers treat­ed them essen­tial­ly in an eth­no-cen­tric man­ner.

The long-sus­pect­ed absten­tion “won” on 25 May, when less than half of the vot­ers par­tic­i­pat­ed. In fact, the absten­tion reached 56.03 per­cent of the elec­torate, some­thing unprece­dent­ed for Cypri­ot elec­toral stan­dards. Also, only a small per­cent­age of the reg­is­tered Turk­ish Cypri­ot vot­ers showed up to vote.

Absten­tion from vot­ing has long been attrib­uted to young vot­ers’ indif­fer­ence and vot­er dis­con­tent with tra­di­tion­al pol­i­tics and par­ties. The 2009 Euro-par­lia­ment elec­tions were held in the mid­dle of a three-day local hol­i­day; and so Cypri­ots’ “not leav­ing the beach to vote” was wide­ly cit­ed to explain the record absten­tion (40.60 per­cent). Things, how­ev­er, were more com­pli­cat­ed this time.

Accord­ing to Cypri­ot polit­i­cal ana­lysts, the extra­or­di­nary absten­tion was to be expect­ed as the deci­sion of the Eurogroup for a bailout, which includ­ed a hair­cut on Cypri­ot deposits, was per­ceived by the major­i­ty of the peo­ple as an unsuc­cess­ful eco­nom­ic exper­i­ment, which had a dev­as­tat­ing impact on the over­all econ­o­my of the coun­try and the lives of count­less Euro­pean cit­i­zens. More­over, a large major­i­ty of Cypri­ots believe that the Eurogroup’s deci­sion aimed at down­siz­ing the Cypri­ot bank­ing sec­tor, neglect­ed that the main prob­lem that had arisen for this sec­tor was large­ly its expo­sure to the Greek econ­o­my and debt, which was reduced via a “hair­cut”. Pri­or to the lat­ter, and while EU offi­cials were assur­ing the mar­ket that the Greek bonds were guar­an­teed, banks from a large Euro­pean coun­try were sell­ing these bonds to the Cypri­ot banks with a 20 per­cent dis­count.

The elec­tion results left the major­i­ty of the par­ties rel­a­tive­ly sat­is­fied albeit prob­a­bly alarmed about their polit­i­cal future. The break­down of votes was as fol­lows: Rul­ing con­ser­v­a­tive Demo­c­ra­t­ic Ral­ly (DISY) 37.75 per­cent (97,732); left-wing Pro­gres­sive Par­ty of Work­ing Peo­ple (AKEL) 26.98 per­cent (69,852 votes); cen­trist Demo­c­ra­t­ic Par­ty DIKO 10.83 per­cent (28,044); Social Democ­rats Move­ment EDEK/Environmentalists and Ecol­o­gists Move­ment 7.68 per­cent (19,894); Cit­i­zens Alliance 6.78 per­cent (17,549); Mes­sage of Hope 3.83 per­cent (9,907); extreme right Nation­al Pop­u­lar Front ELAM 2.69 per­cent (6,957); and some small for­ma­tions and inde­pen­dent can­di­dates received less than 1 per­cent each.

These results did not sub­stan­tial­ly alter the par­ties’ pow­er and ratio in the polit­i­cal map of Cyprus, despite some shift of vot­ers affect­ed by the par­tic­i­pa­tion of the new cen­tre-left Cit­i­zens Alliance. DISY record­ed the biggest per­cent­age in these elec­tions, although in absolute num­bers of vot­ers it suf­fered a decrease of 14 per­cent and in real num­bers hard­ly got 16 per­cent of reg­is­tered vot­ers. Arguably, even this per­cent­age rep­re­sent­ed a syn­the­sis, since DISY and EVROKO coop­er­at­ed dur­ing the elec­tions.

AKEL, which had faced the biggest pres­sure dur­ing the pre-elec­tion peri­od, man­aged to sus­tain its per­cent­ages by reach­ing 26.98 per­cent. In absolute num­bers AKEL lost more than 1/3 of its 2009 votes. With rough­ly 70,000 votes, the main oppo­si­tion par­ty con­sti­tutes the choice of 11 per­cent of the elec­toral body, which could prove wor­ri­some for its future. Polit­i­cal com­men­ta­tors were con­vinced that AKEL’s new per­cent­ages result­ed from the poor pre­vi­ous pres­i­den­cy by (“com­mu­nist”) Demetris Christofias.

The Cen­trist DIKO suc­ceed­ed, with the help of absten­tion, in exceed­ing the psy­cho­log­i­cal bar­ri­er of 10 per­cent with rel­a­tive com­fort. Nev­er­the­less, in absolute num­bers DIKO lost 25 per­cent of its vot­ers com­pared to 2009. Appar­ent­ly, around 10,000 per­sons did not vote for the par­ty, hence DIKO was cho­sen by 4.6 per­cent of the elec­torate.

As regards the com­bi­na­tion of EDEK-Ecol­o­gists, they received a pos­i­tive vote of 7.68 per­cent, a per­cent­age that is trans­lat­ed, in absolute num­ber of vot­ers, to rough­ly 20,000 votes or 3.3 per­cent of the elec­toral body. This result marked the biggest reduc­tion of elec­toral pow­er com­pared to 2009.

It fol­lows that Cypri­ot polit­i­cal par­ties must work much hard­er towards the dras­tic changes required in the socioe­co­nom­ic and polit­i­cal life of Cyprus and the EU in order to win over the cit­i­zens. Intrigu­ing­ly, “alter­na­tive choic­es,” through can­di­da­tures and com­bi­na­tions that were crit­i­ciz­ing the cur­rent polit­i­cal life, did not seem to impress the elec­torate.

Disappointment over EU

As regards euroscep­ti­cism, if we define the term as the absolute or whole­sale rejec­tion of the EU project, there were no seri­ous polit­i­cal par­ties or for­ma­tions to which this term could be attached. Even AKEL, tra­di­tion­al­ly “Euro­pho­bic” and steadi­ly inim­i­cal to “the EU’s neo-lib­er­al eco­nom­ic poli­cies”, did not call for the rejec­tion of the Union but fought instead to keep its sec­ond EP seat that was being threat­ened accord­ing to numer­ous pre-elec­tion polls.

Euroscep­ti­cism as such was not addressed direct­ly by Cypri­ot polls. And since pub­lic opin­ion was fix­at­ed on the dis­con­cert­ing domes­tic prob­lems, it is hard to sep­a­rate the wide­spread Cypri­ot dis­ap­point­ment with domes­tic insti­tu­tions from the Cypri­ots’ lack of trust exhib­it­ed vis-à-vis the EU as iden­ti­fied by Euro­barom­e­ter 415, Euro­peans in 2014. Accord­ing to data col­lect­ed between 15 and 22 March 2014, only 22 per­cent of Cypri­ots (ver­sus 32 per­cent in the EU aver­age) respond­ed that they tend to trust the EU, while 74 per­cent tend not to trust it (59 per­cent in EU-28). But note­wor­thy is also the Cypri­ots’ par­al­lel lack of trust towards two domes­tic insti­tu­tions. On their Par­lia­ment, while the EU aver­age of trust was 27 per­cent, the Cypri­ots’ was only 15 per­cent (while the cor­re­spond­ing lack of trust was 68 per­cent and 83 per­cent). As for their Gov­ern­ment, the Cypri­ots’ trust lev­el was 22 per­cent (EU 26 per­cent) while the lack of trust was 74 per­cent (EU-28, 71 per­cent).

Recall­ing the broad­er caus­es of Cypri­ot dis­sat­is­fac­tion, dis­ap­point­ment and even anger pre­ced­ing these elec­tions, we sub­mit that, cur­rent­ly in Cyprus, we seem to be con­front­ed by a phase of Euro-dis­ap­point­ment, albeit cohab­it­ing with a dor­mant Euro-opti­mism.

Thus, DISY pres­i­dent, Averof Neo­phy­tou, stat­ed to the Cyprus News Agency (CNA) on 15 May 2014 that his par­ty always sup­ports the EU; that its can­di­dates “could shine” in the Euro-Par­lia­ment being capa­ble of “bring­ing to Cyprus the good things of Europe”; that “DISY insists on Europe, because it is imper­a­tive to apply to the solu­tion of the Cyprus prob­lem the prin­ci­ples and val­ues of Europe [i.e. the EU]”. He then added: “…we wish to ren­der our coun­try an insep­a­ra­ble part of the ener­gy secu­ri­ty of Europe”.

Sim­i­lar­ly, in his own CNA inter­view on 16 May 2014, Par­lia­ment Speak­er and EDEK pres­i­dent, Yian­nakis Omirou, iden­ti­fied his party’s key goals: to present the vision of a Europe of sol­i­dar­i­ty, equal­i­ty and respect for the nation­al char­ac­ter­is­tics of each mem­ber-state; “away from the neo-lib­er­al recipes of aus­ter­i­ty and a crip­pling bud­getary dis­ci­pline”; and “a Europe of the peo­ples and not a Europe of the num­bers”. Omirou also added that, “despite the jus­ti­fied bit­ter­ness for the painful and cat­a­stroph­ic deci­sion [of the Eurogroup]…our posi­tion was and remains Euro­pean. We remain Euro­pean and fight for a Europe of the peo­ples, of sol­i­dar­i­ty, and of social cohe­sion.” And while Neo­phy­tou empha­sized his party’s sup­port for Jean-Claude Junck­er (who had vis­it­ed Nicosia recent­ly), Pres­i­dent Omirou gave his party’s unqual­i­fied sup­port to Mar­tin Schulz.

As regards the “his­toric” absten­tion of 56.03 per­cent, RAI Con­sul­tants inves­ti­gat­ed the rea­sons on behalf of the Nicosia dai­ly Phileleft­heros: a mind-bog­gling 84 per­cent account­ed for it by dis­ap­point­ment and frus­tra­tion with the “polit­i­cal sys­tem”. More specif­i­cal­ly, (polit­i­cal) dis­ap­point­ment account­ed for 16 per­cent; the answer “no politi­cian sat­is­fies me” reached 11 per­cent; sen­ti­ments against the polit­i­cal sys­tem, 9 per­cent; “no politi­cian is worth­while”, anoth­er 9 per­cent; (absten­tion) to see those respon­si­ble for the eco­nom­ic cri­sis pun­ished, 9 per­cent; “I do not trust any (politi­cian)”, 9 per­cent; “no one cares/they all work in their own inter­est”, 8 per­cent; and small­er per­cent­ages for protest for the fail­ure to pun­ish those respon­si­ble, and dis­ap­point­ment with polit­i­cal par­ties.

To con­clude, the emerg­ing grounds for the fact that almost six out of ten Cypri­ots did not vote on 25 May 2014 seem to be frus­tra­tion and anger against the country’s politi­cians for their polit­i­cal acts and omis­sions that relate to both domes­tic issues and their fail­ure to mobi­lize the EU in sup­port of Cypri­ot caus­es and needs.


2. The EU’s Neighbourhood

Russia: a long-standing friend and supporter of Cyprus

Greek Cypri­ots have long regard­ed Moscow as the prin­ci­pal pro­tec­tor of their country’s rights, pri­mar­i­ly in the Unit­ed Nations Secu­ri­ty Coun­cil (fol­lowed by France and Chi­na), and a sol­id and con­sis­tent eco­nom­ic part­ner in var­i­ous fields, includ­ing trade, bank­ing and tourism. Hence, fol­low­ing the Crimea cri­sis, most polit­i­cal for­ma­tions — except DISY — kept voic­ing their sen­si­tiv­i­ty regard­ing Cyprus’s rela­tions with Moscow, while acknowl­edg­ing that, strict­ly or for­mal­ly, Pres­i­dent Putin’s bold ini­tia­tive did not un-prob­lem­at­i­cal­ly con­form to inter­na­tion­al law. Pres­i­dent Anas­tasi­ades asked from the out­set that, should EU sanc­tions against Russ­ian inter­ests hurt Cyprus’s sui gener­is rela­tions with Rus­sia, com­pen­sato­ry mea­sures should be extend­ed by the EU to Cyprus. To be sure, some Nicosia colum­nists sup­port­ed Pres­i­dent Putin open­ly, while iden­ti­cal voic­es were heard in Cypri­ot civ­il soci­ety. For them, such vio­lent “West­ern” rhetoric against Russia’s deci­sions has nev­er been applied to Turkey’s 1974 inva­sion of Cyprus nor any seri­ous sanc­tions applied against Ankara for decades. In any case, the polit­i­cal elite con­cen­trat­ed on the need to pro­tect at all costs the country’s mate­r­i­al inter­ests and the reli­gious, his­tor­i­cal, cul­tur­al and friend­ly bonds with the Russ­ian peo­ple. In turn, Russ­ian Ambas­sador in Nicosia, Stanislav V. Osad­chyi, has stat­ed repeat­ed­ly that Moscow rec­og­nizes the inevitabil­i­ty of Cyprus’s sid­ing with its EU part­ners.

As regards the future of the spe­cial Rus­sia-Cyprus bilat­er­al rela­tion­ship, while Pres­i­dent Anas­tasi­ades had expressed his will­ing­ness to vis­it Moscow soon after his elec­tion in Feb­ru­ary 2013, the vis­it has not mate­ri­al­ized to date. How­ev­er, For­eign Min­is­ter Ioan­nis Kas­soulides met his coun­ter­part, Sergei Lavrov, in Moscow in ear­ly spring 2014, and agreed “to extend and enrich Rus­sia-Cyprus rela­tions”. Sim­i­lar­ly, the lead­er­ship of AKEL, as the main oppo­si­tion par­ty, also paid a (post-Crimea) offi­cial vis­it to Moscow to cul­ti­vate the long-stand­ing cor­dial rela­tions between the two coun­tries. In addi­tion, both social-demo­c­ra­t­ic EDEK and the Cit­i­zens’ Alliance, head­ed by for­mer For­eign Min­is­ter Yior­gos Lil­likas, have remained vocal pro­po­nents of a strong bilat­er­al rela­tion­ship with Rus­sia, appeal­ing to the Nicosia gov­ern­ment to recall that Moscow has long been a faith­ful friend and the most sol­id diplo­mat­ic pro­tec­tor of the Republic’s rights. How­ev­er, where­as Ambas­sador Osad­chyi has kept reit­er­at­ing that, “if invit­ed”, Moscow is pre­pared to assist Cyprus in the cur­rent bi-com­mu­nal nego­ti­a­tions, Pres­i­dent Anas­tasi­ades and the DISY lead­er­ship appear ful­ly sat­is­fied with the assur­ances of US Ambas­sador John Koenig that Wash­ing­ton is com­mit­ted to pro­tect­ing the rights of the Greek Cypri­ot major­i­ty. Unfor­tu­nate­ly, the US ambassador’s assur­ances and his hyper­ki­net­ic diplo­mat­ic activ­i­ties have deeply dis­ap­point­ed most influ­en­tial Cypri­ot com­men­ta­tors and a large sec­tion of civ­il soci­ety, espe­cial­ly fol­low­ing Koenig’s inter­view with Phileleft­heros on 11 May 2014 in which he advised the Greek Cypri­ots to “trust Turkey more”!

EU double standards

Giv­en the ongo­ing socio-eco­nom­ic malaise in the Repub­lic fol­low­ing the Cyprus-relat­ed Eurogroup’s deci­sions of March 2013, and giv­en also the tem­pes­tu­ous domes­tic debates asso­ci­at­ed with the labyrinthine re-start of Cypri­ot bi-com­mu­nal nego­ti­a­tions, there has been no real dis­cus­sion in (free) Cyprus of EU rela­tions with the East­ern Part­ner­ship coun­tries. Cypri­ot ana­lysts and pub­lic opin­ion have tend­ed to per­ceive “West­ern respons­es” against Pres­i­dent Putin’s Moscow as hyper­bol­ic and moti­vat­ed exclu­sive­ly by geopo­lit­i­cal cal­cu­la­tions and ambi­tions. And when West­ern politi­cians were adamant about apply­ing sanc­tions against Moscow, Cypri­ots kept recall­ing that no sanc­tions have been applied to Turkey, even though the lat­ter had no excuse what­so­ev­er when it invad­ed Cyprus in 1974.

Cov­er­age in the media, post-Crimea, has includ­ed var­i­ous reports about some unsavoury acts by Ukrain­ian extrem­ists, if not “neo-fas­cists”. For this addi­tion­al rea­son, Cypri­ots have favoured the more cau­tious stance of Ger­many, Lux­em­bourg, and Mal­ta regard­ing sanc­tions. Need­less to say, Cypri­ot polit­i­cal elite and pub­lic opin­ion have stressed the need for a diplo­mat­ic solu­tion to the Ukrain­ian prob­lem, lament­ing the pain caused to inno­cent Ukraini­ans and Rus­sians, and look­ing for­ward to keep wel­com­ing Ukrain­ian and Russ­ian tourists to the Mediter­ranean Island. Polit­i­cal ana­lysts not­ed that “diplo­mat­ic means should be exhaust­ed”, adding that “we have to find solu­tions that are pos­si­ble with­out dam­ag­ing the EU’s rela­tions with either Rus­sia or Ukraine, as both coun­tries are essen­tial part­ners of the Union”.

Turkey still occupying Cyprus Republic’s territory

As regards EU-Turkey rela­tions, those tutored in Cyprus’s plight since the 1974 inva­sion and the ille­gal occu­pa­tion of 37 per­cent of Cypri­ot ter­ri­to­ry appre­ci­ate why the rel­e­vant per­cep­tions and sen­ti­ments in the Repub­lic are bound to be idio­syn­crat­ic. Thus, suc­ces­sive Cypri­ot gov­ern­ments have addressed Turkey’s EU prospects ask­ing pri­mar­i­ly whether Turkey’s acces­sion would entail a more demo­c­ra­t­ic, less bel­li­cose and “more Euro­pean” coun­try that would endorse the fair and func­tion­al res­o­lu­tion of Cyprus’s exis­ten­tial prob­lem accord­ing to inter­na­tion­al law and the EU’s cel­e­brat­ed prin­ci­ples and val­ues. Present­ly, it is remark­able that cen­tre-right DISY and “com­mu­nist” AKEL togeth­er con­sti­tute the “opti­mistic” camp, sup­port­ing Turkey’s EU acces­sion and the cor­re­spond­ing favourable “nar­ra­tives”. All oth­er –“Cen­trist”- polit­i­cal for­ma­tions and their fol­low­ers belong to the “scep­ti­cal” camp, for they mis­trust pro­found­ly Ankara’s EU-relat­ed motives and its Cyprus-relat­ed goals. Press colum­nists and oth­er opin­ion-mak­ers are divid­ed anal­o­gous­ly. Thus, the influ­en­tial colum­nists of Nicosia’s lead­ing dailies, Phileleft­heros and Simeri­ni, seem to be pro­vid­ing more ratio­nal and rea­son­able read­ings of the EU-Turkey-Cyprus conun­drum. They are crit­i­cal of the Anas­tasi­ades pres­i­den­cy, since they per­ceive it as act­ing in a naïve, short-sight­ed or self-destruc­tive man­ner vis-à-vis Turkey and EU-Turkey rela­tions.


3. Power relations in the EU

Mixed perceptions of Germany

The euro cri­sis has trans­formed polit­i­cal and eco­nom­ic rela­tions with­in the EU from a club of sup­pos­ed­ly equal coun­tries to groups of cred­i­tors and debtors. As the largest cred­i­tor coun­try, Ger­many has gained dis­pro­por­tion­ate polit­i­cal pow­er with­in Europe. By many mea­sures, it is per­ceived as Europe’s dom­i­nant coun­try, both polit­i­cal­ly and eco­nom­i­cal­ly. Some polit­i­cal ana­lysts are wor­ried that Ger­many is using its pow­er self­ish­ly to impose aus­ter­i­ty poli­cies on south­ern Europe and to pro­mote its self-regard­ing inter­ests dis­re­gard­ing the main core val­ues of the EU — i.e. equal­i­ty and sol­i­dar­i­ty. The bail-in pol­i­cy imposed on Cyprus, and acknowl­edged by many eco­nom­ic experts as a failed exper­i­ment that only deep­ened and pro­longed the cri­sis, is wide­ly con­sid­ered as proof of the above.

And yet, the major­i­ty of Cypri­ot polit­i­cal elites and a num­ber of polit­i­cal ana­lysts believe that Ger­many could and should play a pos­i­tive role in the nov­el efforts to over­come the eco­nom­ic cri­sis in Cyprus. It is note­wor­thy that a num­ber of Ger­man banks and enter­pris­es have expressed their inter­est to invest in the coun­try as nat­ur­al gas is cre­at­ing new syn­er­gies for bilat­er­al coop­er­a­tion through pri­vate ini­tia­tives. Thus, a high lev­el del­e­ga­tion from the Deutsche Bank vis­it­ed Nicosia in order to dis­cuss financ­ing prospects for a liq­ue­fied nat­ur­al gas (LNG) ter­mi­nal. Accord­ing to the CNA, the vis­its from the Deutsche Bank del­e­ga­tion as well as Euro­pean Invest­ment Bank offi­cials are linked to the government‘s efforts to involve Euro­pean investors in the devel­op­ment of the island’s nat­ur­al gas reserves via an onshore LNG ter­mi­nal. Dur­ing his ear­ly May 2014 vis­it to Berlin, Pres­i­dent Anas­tasi­ades stat­ed that “the gov­ern­ment will con­tin­ue the efforts to attract for­eign invest­ment and Ger­many could find many syn­er­gies and oppor­tu­ni­ties in the emerg­ing Cypri­ot econ­o­my” (Phileft­heros).

Cohabitation of austerity and growth

Cypri­ot aca­d­e­mics, econ­o­mists and polit­i­cal ana­lysts favour a bal­ance between aus­ter­i­ty and growth mea­sures in order to have a sus­tain­able econ­o­my. In this eco­nom­ic envi­ron­ment, “aus­ter­i­ty” in the form of bal­anc­ing expen­di­tures and rev­enues does not hold back growth. On the con­trary, it improves con­fi­dence on the part of poten­tial investors and low­ers the cost of gov­ern­ment bor­row­ing. Nev­er­the­less, these poli­cies should be accom­pa­nied by incen­tives giv­en to busi­ness in order to kick-start the econ­o­my. More­over, full scale pro­grammes should be imple­ment­ed in order to attract for­eign invest­ments in the coun­try and gen­er­ous incen­tives should be giv­en in order to tack­le unem­ploy­ment.

UK is important for the Union

Britain’s rela­tions with the EU are broad­ly work­ing well in key areas. Cyprus has a close, mul­ti­level, bilat­er­al rela­tion­ship with the UK. Even though there was no dis­cus­sion in our coun­try con­cern­ing a pos­si­ble UK exit from the EU, it is our opin­ion, in tan­dem with a large sec­tor of Cypri­ot civ­il soci­ety, that the Euro­pean Union is an his­toric exper­i­ment that con­cerns all Euro­pean coun­tries, hence a pos­si­ble UK exit would be fol­lowed by many and unfore­seen neg­a­tive impli­ca­tions.


This sur­vey was con­duct­ed on the basis of a ques­tion­naire that has been elab­o­rat­ed in March 2014. Most of the reports were deliv­ered in June 2014. This issue and all pre­vi­ous issues are avail­able on the EU-28 Watch web­site:

The EU-28 Watch No. 10 receives sig­nif­i­cant fund­ing from the Otto Wolff-Foun­da­tion, Cologne, in the frame­work of the ‘Dia­log Europa der Otto Wolff-Stiftung’, and finan­cial sup­port from the Euro­pean Com­mis­sion. The Euro­pean Com­mis­sion is not respon­si­ble for any use that may be made of the infor­ma­tion con­tained there­in.